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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"If you ask us to define the role of the district 
superintendent you'll get 29 different versions." 
"Superintendents were like the Jews in the wilderness -
wandering forty days and nights with no idea where they 
were going and no defined role." 
"We have a problem. The role of the superintendent has 
not yet been identified and there are current practices 
which significantly prevent the role being adequately 
explored. So we fly by the seat of our pants." 
"Our role is shaped by what happens in the field, not in 
principle from Central Office." 
"We've been waiting for the Executive to reveal the grand 
plan, the end product, what the final product looks like 
because we're confused. Now we realise they don't know 
what the end will look like, they haven't got a grand 
plan." 
(District Superintendents, March-April, 1990) 
Before 1987, the work of superintendents was well known throughout the 
state education system. Their role had evolved over a long period of time 
and was firmly established - materially and in the minds of school staff. 
Sometimes people disagreed with how that role was discharged but they did 
have a clear idea of what it entailed. Superintendents also enjoyed a high 
profile. They were commonly seen to occupy powerful and prestigious 
positions, presiding over teachers' careers and curriculum developments. 
The Better Schools Report changed much of that. 
After 1987, the superintendents became fewer in number and lower in 
profile. They were reduced from around 75 to 29 and placed in response 
mode. They were also largely removed from direct involvement with 
2 
classroom teachers and syllabus reform. Ostensibly they lost power, 
status, and leadership. 1 Those changes created uncertainty in the minds 
of school staff about what the real role of the new superintendents was. 
Consequently, perceptions of their work became based on hearsay and 
speculation. Rumours of more restructuring and confusion over the meaning 
of 'auditing' muddied the waters even further. 
Not surprisingly, the nature of the district superintendent's role has 
been a subject of ongoing debate over the past three years and is likely to 
remain so for sometime yet. Such activity is necessary if all the 
stakeholders are to reach common understanding and agreement. This report 
is offered as a contribution to the eventual achievement of that goal. It 
explores a range of pressing issues which affect the definition of the 
superintendent's role. In doing so, it attempts to avoid duplicating the 
work of the Organisation Development Unit and other groups. 
The issues were identified in several ways, namely: by interviewing 
thirteen West Australian superintendents,2 three Ministry officers in 
this state, and a range of educationists in New South Wales, Victoria, and 
South Australia; and by reviewing some of the literature on restructuring 
in Australia and New Zealand. On the basis of material collected from 
those sources, a draft report was written and circulated for comment to 31 
1 One superintendent questioned this claim. He said, "I don't agree 
that the position is necessarily less 'powerful'; it's more a 
change in emphasis - less observable with teachers, more with 
principals." 
2 Of the thirteen interviewed, five were 'new' (appointed to the 
superintendency after the Better Schools Report) and eight were 
superintendents before 1987; a third were from country districts 
and the rest were in the cl ty. 
3 
district superintendents and a small informal reference group. 3 
Twenty seven superintendents took time to offer feedback. Overall, 
their responses endorsed the general themes or theses of the draft report. 
They also provided information for correcting factual inaccuracies, 
qualifying some general statements, and confirming broad claims. As a 
result, the amended report is stronger than the original and has been 
constructed from c.ommunication with nearly all the superintendents. At an 
individual level, different superintendents disagreed with or questioned 
different particular points and comments. Generally, where those responses 
were brief or solitary, they have been included as footnotes. The longer 
and less isolated dissenting responses are presented in a separate chapter 
at the end of the report. 
Most of what ls said in the following pages consists of ideas provided 
by superintendents. However they are not responsible for the way their 
comments have been selected, interpreted, and structured. Therefore, 
despite the fact that on different aspects of various issues the 
superintendents have been left to speak for themselves, this report can not 
be taken as necessarily representing the views of the superintendency. 
Similarly, whilst the study was carried out under the auspices of the 
International Institute for Polley and Administrative Studies (IIPAS), the 
researcher was given a free hand to conduct an independent inquiry. 
Consequently, the report should not be seen as a position paper of the 
Institute. 
3 There are 29 district superintendent positions in Western 
Australia. One superintendent declined to participate in the 
study. The extra three were those on leave or seconded to Central 
Office. The reference group consisted of a school principal, two 
district office consultants, and four people at Central Office. 
Because these people never met as a group, they are better 
regarded as a collection of individuals who constituted a 
reference set. 
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Unless otherwise indicated, all the inset single-line-spaced quotations 
are comments made by superintendents. The same applies to the footnotes. 
In a few instances the term Executive in these quotations has been 
substituted for the name of particular individuals. Moreover, some of the 
quotations have been "edited to remove the hesitations and repetitions of 
ordinary speech ...... and sometimes with intervening statements on other 
topics deleted" (Connell 1985:7). 
After the draft report was circulated, a few reviewers claimed they 
could put a name to nearly all the superintendents' comments quoted in the 
text. Several said words to the effect, "I can identify comments made by 
Superintendent X and Superintendent Y." Interestingly neither X nor Y were 
interviewed. It would be a pity if anyone became preoccupied with that 
type of exercise. The superintendents' comments bring to the study a 
degree of richness, authenticity, and urgency that would not be possible 
had they been excluded. The comments were made in good faith, reported in 
good faith, and deserve to be received in good faith. This is not. to say 
they must be agreed with, but it does mean they should be examined 
constructively and openly rather than treated dismissively and 
prejudicially. When examining these comments, then, it is important for 
readers to focus on the issues rather than the individuals, on points 
rather than personalities, and on what was said rather than on who said it. 
The study owes a lot to the thirty four people who, despite busy 
schedules, made time to be interviewed and respond thoughtfully to the 
draft report. Also, it would not have been conducted or completed without 
the· support and encouragement of Dr Margaret Crowley, Director of IPPAS. 
A final point warrants particular mention: This report does not 
document the substantial contribution made by superintendents to the 
development of Better Schools throughout the state; that is one of the 
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drawbacks of an approach which focusses on unresolved issues. Furthermore, 
because of the issues-based approach, the spotlight in this study tends to 
settle on areas of dissatisfaction, confusion, and conflict caused by 
radical change over the past few years. For that reason, the report 
reflects the superintendents' perspectives on events leading up to the 
present rather than their visions for the future. Unless readers keep 
these methodologically driven constraints constantly in mind they may form 
the view that superintendents are a less-than-optimistic group. Such an 
impression would be quite unfair. As people who have seen superintendents 
at close quarters will testify, any pessimism conveyed in this report ls 
. 
decisively outweighed by the high level of professionalism that 
characterizes their work and the positive nature of their outlook on the 
direction of education in Western Australia. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A TWO TIER SYSTEM 
Restructuring 
"In most western countries. two apparently contradictory 
developments seem to have been occurring over schools. 
There has been a tendency to push more and more 
responsibility on to the local schools ....... This tendency 
has carried labels like decentralisation and devolution, 
privatisation and participation ....... It is a movement 
away from the centre and toward diversified control. 
The second development is recentralisation; governments 
and ministers have tried to reassert control in several key 
areas like resource management, measuring outcomes; 
programme budgeting, teacher appraisal · and setting global 
priorities. This second transition has been accompanied by 
formal restructuring of education systems so that the lines 
of control are simplified and made more direct ........ 
The two movements - a simultaneous decentralising and 
recentralising - are implied in Peters and Waterman's term 
'loose/tight structures'. a common characteristic of their . 
identified excellent companies. It is as though in areas of 
central importance to the health of the whole organisation 
there is firm central control; and where creativity, 
entrepreneurship and local initiative are needed, there is 
wider freedom given to the member units" {Beare, Caldwell 
and Millikan 1989:71). 
In some places, the simultaneous recentralising and decentralising has 
led to a two tier system. For example, before 1988, the administration of 
the Victorian state education system was divided into three tiers - the 
centre, the regions, and the schools. In that year, a new structure was 
implemented. It consists not of three tiers but of two - a unified State 
Office and schools. The centre, as previously known, was abolished. The 
regions, as previously known. were abolished. There are still branches at 
the centre and offices in eight regions but they are combined to form a 
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unified State Office (Victorian Ministry of Education 1987:6). 
Similarly, before 1988, the administration of New Zealand's state 
education system was divided into three tiers - the centre, the regions, 
and the schools. In that year, the Picot Report recommended a new 
structure. It consists not of three tiers but of two - a central Ministry 
and schools. The regions were abolished and no formal administrative 
structure was set up at district level. Instead, within the proposed new 
system, "each institution receives most of its funding directly from a 
central agency, undertakes responsibility for defining its objectives 
within national objectives, and has control of the resources available to 
it" (Picot 1988:53). 
In Western Australia, before 1987, the administration of the state 
education system was divided into three tiers - the centre, the regions, 
and the schools. 1 In that year, a new structure was set up along lines 
recommended in the Better Schools Report. Arguably, it consists not of 
three tiers but of two - a unified Central Office and schools. That is, 
the district offices are not a third tier. The district superintendents 
are part of the unified Central Office and the other staff in the district 
offices belong to the schools.2 
Reapoaaea 
1 "Administrative control in primary schools only. Secondary was 
controlled from the centre." 
2 "I think this is simplistic. All district office staff operate 
between Central Office and schools. Their alignment depends on 
the task being undertaken." 
"Not quite true. 'Other staff' (S.D.O's) are expected to be 
curriculum missionaries as well as school-owned facilitators." 
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Rationale 
Western Australia established education regions some fifteen years 
ago. They were a form of middle management designed to broaden the 
administrative base of the Education Department and bring centrally 
determined programmes and services closer to schools. In practice, they 
limited the scope of schools to respond to the needs of their communities 
and they restricted the capacity of Central Office to respond to the needs 
of schools. Their removal was intended to rectify this situation and 
increase the power of schools and the centre. 
Up to a point the regional offices did provide more decentralisation of 
decision making - but only for the regional superintendents, not for the 
schools. 3 If anything, they brought schools under closer central 
scrutiny than was the case in earlier times when schools were better 
placed to be 'out of sight, out of mind'. 
At the primary school level, the regional offices also perpetuated a 
culture of paternalism and learned dependency, both of which effectively 
prevented schools becoming the optimal units for educational change. (At 
the secondary level, subject superintendents based at Central Office 
performed that function.) For example, before 1987 it was the 
superintendent who assessed individual teachers and recommended their 
permanency - not the principals. It was the superintendent who evaluated 
the school programme and determined the most effective way of raising 
students' performance - not the people in the school.4 It was the 
Repoases 
3 "A negative view. Opportunities existed for 'having a say' 
through the regional superintendent and for cooperative 
planning." 
4 "True, but the how was important. Schools and teachers provided 
the evidence for the report - not very different from 
demonstrating accountability." 
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superintendent who was responsible for causing significant changes to 
occur - not members of the local school community (Organisation 
Development Unit 1990A). As some former regional superintendents 
explained, those times have changed. 
"In the old days I was king of the regional office. We had 
a separate identity. Now the district office only exists 
to the extent that it helps schools develop the school 
development plan; that is, we are only facilitators, not 
curriculum experts." 
"The regional superintendent was seen as the super 
principal. If any problems arose then the superintendent 
would tell people what to do." 
"We don't have the same professional autonomy that we used 
to have. In the past I could send out my own regional 
policies that I made up by myself. 
"The regional offices were proactive in putting up and 
funding professional development programmes, making schools 
an offer they couldn't refuse. Now we don't do anything 
unless requested; we are in response mode. We are always 
leading from behind. The Ministry and schools set the 
state of play."!! 
Apart from inhibiting the development of self-determining schools, the 
regional offices - as mini Education Departments - added to the 
fragmentation of Head Office, weakened its control, and thereby obstructed 
the management of change. In the interests of setting up a responsive 
bureaucracy they had to be disbanded and replaced by district offices. A 
responsive bureaucracy focuses on the needs of clients rather than the 
needs of the system. In the case of education, that means a desire and a 
Responses 
!I "It should be made clear that some former superintendents who are 
now district superintendents considered there were major 
weaknesses in the regional structure. Similarly, there were 
major problems with the secondary subject superintendency. Too 
many of this group saw themselves as 'heirs apparent' to key 
Central Office positions. I saw many prospective teachers with 
· strong academic and performance backgrounds 'turned off' teaching 
as a result of their dealings with some arrogant subject 
superintendents." 
10 
capacity to respond quickly and flexibly to the needs of schools 
(Victorian Ministry of Education 1985:5.5). It also means that, "The 
administrative system should be simple and uncomplicated with as few 
layers and sections as practicable. There should be no services 
overlapped or paralleled by others" (Picot 1988:4). To regard district 
offices as a separate tier, then, places the prospect of a responsive 
bureaucracy at risk. 
There is another reason why the 'districts' should not be seen as an 
independent third tier; they are supposed to be only the sum of their 
parts. A high school is more than the sum of its subject departments; 
for example, it has whole school policies. The state education system is 
more than the sum of its schools; for example, there are system-wide 
policies.6 But districts can not impose things like goals, priorities, 
policies, regulations, curriculum frameworks, and staffing decisions on 
schools in the same way that Central Office can.7 Furthermore, they 
have no basis outside of the education system for their existence or 
identity. They have no social, political, or economic reason to be.a 
Their boundaries do not coincide with any sporting, cultural or government 
divisions.9 They cannot raise funds through local rates and taxes. 
Reaponaea 
s "Only a handful." 
1 "To be only the sum of its parts would hardly allow for 
effective operation. The district office staff need a home base 
of support, a team awareness, a coherence, and a knowledge of 
their team strength." 
8 "Try doing away with district offices in the country and there 
will be political reasons to be." 
9 "We've redrawn PCAP boundaries to fit state education district 
boundaries." 
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Factors Confounding a Two Tier System 
Under a two tier system, districts are simply nominal entities which 
house two separate groups - superintendents from Central Office on the one 
hand, and consultants for the schools on the other. Unless that 
distinction is accepted and observed, the change from a three to a two 
tier system will not occur. Nor will it happen unless it is recognised 
that tiers exist not only organisationally but also in the minds of 
people. The obstacles to be faced are cultural as well as institutional. 
It is useful then to examine some of the factors that so far have 
confounded the development of a two tier system. 
Throughout the first year of the new system (1988), it might have 
seemed that not a lot had changed. The 28 regional superintendent 
positions under the old system were replaced by 29 district 
superintendents.to Like their predecessors, the district 
superintendents were made responsible for some 25-30 schools and given the 
task of supervising the performance of the whole school, not just one 
subject within schools. In many cases, they simply took over the offices 
of the regional superintendents. On top of that. the Better Schools 
Report explicitly outlined the setting up of three levels - school, 
district, and Central Office. 
Also, during the early stages of setting up the districts the 
superintendents were often portrayed as leaders of their own distinct 
domain. For instance, when they visited schools, met community groups, 
and were written up in the local media, it ws.s as 'district 
Responses 
10 "Though, the 28 regional superintendents worked out of only 15 
regional offices." 
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superintendents' - not Central Office superintendents. Inside the 
district office they were required to act as managers - supervising staff, 
chairing major committees, and authorising financial transactions. 
Frequently, that led to a sense of ownership and a view that the manager 
of the district office had to be the superintendent. Again, these 
perceptions reinforced an impression that superintendents were leaders of 
their own distinct domain. 11 At times it was more than an impression. 
"Initially I had trouble changing. I wanted to own all the 
district office staff." 
"Superintendents who have 'I am the principal of 37 primary 
schools' mentality are those who want to be the boss of the 
district office." 
"When I first became a superintendent I tried to be the 
principal of thirty principals." 
"I've stayed a mother hen because school development 
planning is such a complex business. I needed to keep it 
going and add my experience to it and prevent five district 
office staff going out and giving five different messages 
on school development processes. At the beginning the 
district office staff needed my hand at the tiller. But 
I'm stepping away now because I've got more and more work 
to do." 
"The traditional role of the superintendent has involved 
being in charge of the district office. Where the PEO's 
have been used it has led to some difficulties in schools. 
The PEO comes to be regarded as an assistant superintendent 
and ls cast into a decision making role across schools in 
the absence of the superintendent, and schools have 
objected to the difficulties of getting to the 
superintendent because he has been screened from the 
principals by the PEO." 
"Most district offices have the superintendent in charge. 
It'll come to a head when the audit role takes on the 
dimensions that it should. Then the district 
superintendent wlll have no time to manage the district 
office. Up till now they have." 
Responses 
11 
"They still are. I think to some extent they shall continue to 
exert some leadership because district superintendents have 
leadership ablllty and to some extent it is needed." 
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"The district office needs the superintendent for unity." 
"Principals have enough to do managing their own schools. 
They shouldn't have to manage the district. I have 
responsibility for the management of the district office. 
I'm an integral part of the district office and its 
services because when I'm out in school I'm able to keep in 
touch with their needs and a lot of what goes on in the 
district office should reflect what goes on in schools. I 
prefer to operate out of the district office, not from a 
separate office. It if gets to the point of me having to 
be out of the district office then I'd resign because I'd 
be just a police person." 
Several other factors continue to confound the two tier system. For 
example, the districts, like the regions, have a material identity of 
their own: geographical boundaries; buildings that are physically 
separate from Central Office and schools; district mottos, logos, 
letterheads; and 'district' personnel - superintendents, consultants, and 
support start. As several superintendents observed: 
"There is considerable misunderstanding throughout the 
Ministry about the two tier system. But while we exist 
physically, there will always be confusion." 
"The three separate locations (school, district, centre) 
create a perception of three tiers. Confusion, in the 
perception of schools, has resulted because of this 
matter. The superintendent was proclaiming a 
support-to-principals' role while on site and this seemed 
to contradict the idea of the superintendent being part of 
Central Office." 
Also, group dynamics ensure that the staff in each district office 
become more than a collection of individuals. The superintendent, 
consultants,11 and clerical staff share the same accommodation, interact 
on a daily and collegial basis, and are generally employed under 
12 NB: Throughout this report, the term district 'consultant' 
refers to district education officers, school development 
officers, and student service officers - even though that ls not 
the official meaning of the word within the system. 
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conditions that differ from those of staff in schools. 13 Over time they 
become a group with their own culture, structure, ethos, identity, and set 
of loyalties. 14 The superintendents are an integral part of this 
group. It is unrealistic to expect them to be otherwise. Thus, in the 
words of one superintendent, "The best moments come when I'm with my own 
district office staff." Almost invariably they become the leader of the 
group, partly because: 
"We're only allowed one promotional position. Therefore 
the district office staff don't have the status and 
experience to manage things, they are just teachers. So 
the superintendent needs to be in charge, to sympathize, 
and keep the overall direction right." 
"Superintendents still have to make the 'hard' decisions in 
district offices. No one else has the authority or power 
base at present." 
For their part, the consultants want the superintendent to be the leader 
of the district office - at least according to some superintendents. 
"The district office staff want a superintendent as someone 
to identify with, someone they know they can talk to about 
career and personal situations." 
"Why don't superintendents delegate their authority? 
Because district office staff want to relate to a manager 
at the superintendent level rather than to a PEO." 
"The district office staff don't want to lose contact with 
the superintendent. They want direct contact, mainly to 
talk about their career and promotion." 
The end result or such group dynamics is that fre'}uently the 
superintendent and consultants come to see themselves as belonging to the 
same tier, and an independent one at that. 
Responses 
13 "Guidance officers in district offices work under the same 
conditions as teachers in schools." 
14 "There is no problem with this as long as all efforts of the 
group are to support schools and achieve their own and Ministry 
or Education determined priorities." 
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For historical and organisational reasons, school staff also see 
district superintendents and consultants as belonging to the same tier. 
From long experience of working in a hierarchical organisation they have 
come to regard districts as being "somewhere in the pecking order between 
themselves and the Central Office, but if anything more closely aligned to 
the Central Office than to them" (Organisation Development Unit 
19908: 1 ). 111 Within the present structure, the existence of line 
management reinforces an image of the organisation as being hierarchical 
and centralized rather than flat and devolved. 
Another obstacle to establishing a two tier system is that Central 
Office uses district offices to perform a range of tasks, such as: 
promoting Ministry initiatives, handling mlnlsterials, organising 
inservice work, and carrying out various administrative functions -
particularly those related to the collection and distribution of 
information and money. For instance: 
"We divvy up some money: for example, the minor works 
programme. It's a role we have. At present we operate as 
a distribution point for Ministry funds. We have at least 
a dozen committees. Some of these functions will disappear 
because schools should be allowed to govern themselves." 
"If parents phone Central Office, then Central Office 
deflects the calls back to us." 
"Take the new language, maths, and art syllabuses. Central 
Office has given us responsibility for monitoring the 
implementation of them and actually implementing them. We 
run the induction programmes, the inservice programmes." 
"The district office ls not determined Just by schools. 
The Ministry installs people in the district office to do 
Central Office things, industrial things, tied Commonwealth 
things." 
Reapoaaes 
1!1 "Schools see our district office as being aligned with them, not 
Central Office." 
"I don't think so! More closely aligned to schools would be the 
general perception." 
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"Our role is too big. I shouldn't have to handle 
ministerials. One Minister tied. up my officers for two 
weeks getting information and we never knew if it was of 
any use." 
"Much of the confusion occurs at top levels in Central 
Office and when Central Office staff try to use district 
office staff to do the 'hard' things." 
Sometimes these delegated tasks take priority over the district office's 
primary function of providing support to schools. 16 As a result, 
district office staff run the risk of being seen as Central Office 
functionaries rather than auxillaries of the school. 17 They also face 
the problem of trying to please multiple masters - the superintendent, 
other Central Office people, and the schools. An associated problem is 
that of having to choose between different groups competing for their 
loyality, as was the case during the industrial dispute last year. 
A Clarifying Step 
A number of superintendents have thought about a straightforward way to 
negate the factors confounding a two tier system. It involves formally 
separating the office of the superintendent from the office of the 
district consultants. The two offices could remain in the same building 
but they would be officially independent of each other. 
Responses 
16 
"Yes, and most district office staff want to be seen as 
having some sort of 'power'. 
17 
"Put another way, district offices are located within the 
demilitarized zone between schools and Central Office, thus: 
Schools District Offices Central Office 
t 
{Them) Us {Us) Them" 
17 
The office of the district superintendent would: 
o be controlled from Central Office 
o have its own executive support staff and budget 
o handle all tasks currently delegated from Central Office 
to the districts, and any other tasks that may be 
delegated 
o have line management responsibilities towards staff in 
schools and the office of the district consultants. 
The office of the district consultants would: 
o be managed by a principal education officer (PEO) 
o have its own executive support staff and budget 
o be staffed by people who have no line management 
responsibilities towards the schools 
o be controlled by a district-based decision-making group 
(DBDMG), or district management committee (DMC), 
consisting of an elected group of principals, deputy 
principals, and other school staff in the district 
o not handle any tasks delegated from Central Office, 
without authorisation from the DBDMG or DMC 
o be renamed school support centres (as in Victoria) or 
education resource centres (as in N.S.W.). 
Under a structure where the district superintendent is formally 
separated from the district office, the relationship between the two is 
similar to that between superintendents and schools. In effect, the 
district office becomes another school in the district: the PE018 is 
the principal, the other district office staff are the school staff, and 
. -------------------------------------------------------
ResPOaaes 
1e "This (PEO) is a title with unfortunate connotations." [The 
term PEO conflicts with the spirit of a flat structure. 
However, it does highlight and enhance the idea of the district 
office being another school in the district, complete with a 
'principal'. J 
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the DBDMG is the SBDMG.19 A slight difference is that the DBDMG is more 
of a management committee than the SBDMG; it has a more prominent role in 
producing a district plan than the SBDMG does with the school development 
plan. Correspondingly, the PEO ls more a manager and less an instructional 
leader than is the school principal.20 The principals on the DMC 
collectively constitute the instructional leader of the district office. 
Furthermore, under such a structure, the superintendent is responsible 
for auditing the district plan and for managing the performance of the 
PEO. The PEO, in turn, is responsible for the performance management of 
the district office staff. In other words, "the manager of the district 
office is accountable to the district superintendent and the board of 
management, Just as the principal is accountable to the district 
superintendent and the school decision making group. The district 
superintendent can no more direct the staff in the district office than he 
er she can direct school staff" (Organisation Development Unit 
10908:5).21 
This proposal relieves superintendents from managing the district office 
and being responsible for the professional development and appraisal of all 
district office staff. It thereby allows thetn more time to 
Reapoaaea 
19 
"This ls a much easier task in the metro area. It is not as 
simple in the country, and it is costly. Also, many principals 
in country districts are young and inexperienced and are busy 
enough learning their new positions without taking on yet 
another committee chore." 
"There ls a danger of schools getting what they want rather than 
what they need, based on quality information. It would be okay 
for some principals but more training is still needed for 
others." 
20 
"The district officer should do the administration tasks. The 
PEO manages the support functions for schools." 
21 
"I think 70-80% of superintendents would not like or agree with 
this statement." 
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supervise the performance of all schools in their district and provide 
principals with professional support to manage the development and 
implementation of school plans.22 
District consultants also benefit from the proposal.23 No longer 
would they need to feel responsible for ensuring that schools are working 
within Ministry policy or implementing Ministry initiatives - that job 
would rest exclusively with the office of the district superintendent. No 
longer would they be caught in the middle of competing claims for their 
loyalty and services - their clear commitment would be to the schools. No 
longer would they have to feel like outsiders or intruders when visiting 
schools - they would be delivering programmes and services requested by the 
schools. On the last point, however, there is evidently a danger that: 
"As long as staff arrive in the district office without a 
clear understanding of what their purpose is, yet 
determined to be useful to schools, they will very likely 
fall into the trap of busily responding to school requests 
regardless of their nature. The skills of consultancy are 
complex and only acquired with difficulty over a long 
period of time. It is unrealistic to expect that teachers 
can be plucked from the classroom and installed as a 
consultant a few weeks later with almost no preparation. 
Instead of consulting with schools, what tends to happen 
is that the consultant tries to solve the problems the 
schools serve up in order to gain some credibillty or be of 
use. If he or she is successful at solving the problem, 
the school will continue to refer problems to the 
consultant for solutions rather than get better at solving 
its own problems. If the consultant is unsuccessful at 
solving the problem, schools decry the value of such people 
and feel unsupported. 
To be able to take the problem tendered by the school, 
frame it in a way that encourages the school to examine it 
Responses 
22 "The above advocacy tends to gloss over the diversity 
principle. Do all district offices have to be the same? I 
think not. Discharge of the functions must be in the context of 
local factors. You could just as easily obtain the same outcome 
with differing structures and various role relationships." 
2a "What about the public servants? Consider how they would need 
to be deployed." 
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in a context of self determining schools, and then assist 
the school to mobilize its problem solving capacity, is not 
easy. If we want district consultants to enhance the 
school's ability to solve its own problems (something 
fundamental to self determining schools) then we need to 
commit resources and develop the human resource policies to 
support this. Putting people in district offices and 
expecting them to behave like skilled consultants is not · 
good enough" (Organisation Development Unit 19908:4-5).J 
Future Prospects 
Despite the obstacles referred to earlier, there are grounds for 
claiming that a two tier system is evolving along the lines of the 
proposal outlined above. Now that the district offices are largely 
established, the superintendents are disengaging from much of the 
day-to-day administration. They are concentrating more on providing 
professional development and support for principals and supervising the 
implementation of the school development plan guidelines. 
Also, district boards of management are being set up and controlled by 
school principals.24 In some districts, principal education officers 
have been appointed on a trial basis to oversee the running of the 
office. In other districts, an office manager has been appointed from the 
ranks of the school consultants. These developments allow the 
superintendents to spend more time in schools and less time in the 
district office. 
Responses 
24 "Is this real?" 
"What does this mean? These boards are not controlled by 
anyone." 
"This is easier in the metro. It is not desired by principals 
in my district." 
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Two other developments warrant mention. One is that some districts are 
thinking of combining forces to provide one large resource centre." In 
doing so they will highlight the district office's primary role of 
providing support for schools. 26 The other development involves 
information technology. In future Central Office will have progressively 
less need to use the district as a medium for collecting and distributing 
data related to schools. Instead it will be able to interface directly 
with schools through faxes, computer noticeboards, and so on. 27 
Finally, as the following comments indicate, some superintendents 
have a concept of the present and a vision of the future consistent with a 
two tier type system. 
"The district superintendent will gradually come out of the 
district office and principals will have total control. 
I'd rather be in, but I think I'll end up outside -
auditing. But if I'm in I'll be the big daddy over the 
top. 
"The district office is resourced from the school resource 
allocation to perform functions of economies of scale that 
schools can't perform by themselves. The alternative is to 
distribute district office staff to the schools without 
remainder." 
"The district superintendent is an extension of Central 
Office; the Chief Executive Officer determines the future 
of the district superintendent. The district office is an 
extension of the schools; the schools determine the future 
of the district office." 
"The district office operation is in two parts: the office 
of the district superintendent is seen quite rightly as 
75-25 Central-Office-related rather than school-related. 
The rest of the district office is a support and service 
centre and should be seen as 20-80 Central Office versus 
schools." 
Responses 
" "This is the case in a number of districts. It is more a 
legacy of the old regional structure." 
26 "Dependent on the resources provided; that is, 'book' 
resources should be in schools." 
27 
"I wonder when - 2001 ?" 
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"In our district office management plan there is no 
directional role, only assisting and supporting. 
Leadership comes from the centre, not the district office." 
"There ls a problem because some superintendents can't 
separate themselves from the district office. Others can. 
I would have a job to do without the school development 
officers. They could go to become part of big support 
centres which are needed because of economies of scale. 
These centres will happen because we need to devolve 
staffing closer to schools." 
"We made a bid for the district office to be owned by the 
schools. The district management committee decides our 
profile and budget; that is, the resources in the district 
office are owned by the schools. The DMC has authority 
because it appoints the E.0.1 and the P.S.4. Only me and 
my secretary are decided by Central Office." 
"Our District Plan clearly states that the district office 
is owned by schools." 
"We're heading in the direction of the district 
superintendent working independently of the district office 
operation. We've rationalised our resource centre. We've 
sent items that really belong to schools back to schools. 
We only have resources that schools can't afford. We're 
here to help schools become self-determining. Half our 
staff are located in schools working on the spot with 
teachers. We are purists on Better Schools. There isn't a 
half way house on this. The district offices do not exist 
to suit the people who work in them" 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CENTRE TIER: SEPARATING OPERATIONS FROM POLICY 
Restructuring took place in Victoria so that the unified State Office 
could provide effective educational leadership. Before 1988, the regions 
in that state were meant to relieve Central Office of direct involvement 
in the administration and management of schools and the system. However, 
the transfer of operational functions to regions was partial and 
incomplete. As a result, the centre continued to concentrate on 
operations "at the expense of the development of a strong policy focus for 
the Schools Division." It therefore lacked a strategic planning capacity 
to "anticipate and respond to the changing education needs of society, 
schools and students. "1 
The Picot Committee identified a further reason for separating 
operations from policy.2 Until 1988 in New Zealand, there was "a 
blurring of policy making and provider roles in that policy makers also 
have responsibility for putting their proposals into effect - so that an 
overcommitment to preconceived ideas may result." Picot argued that, 
"Where these roles are separated, it is easier for the policy implementers 
to see that a particular policy ls unsatisfactory" (1988:30). 
1 Victorian Ministry of Education (1987), The Structure and 
Organisation of the Schools Division, Melbourne, page 5. 
2 The separation of policy from operations is also a feature of the 
Collaborative School Management Cycle developed by Caldwell and 
Spinks. This model advocates at the individual school level, 
there be a "clear and unambiguous specification of those phases 
which are the concern of the group for policy-making ['policy 
group') and of other phases which are the concern of the groups 
responsible for implementing policy ['programme teams') - (Beare, 
Caldwell and Millikan 1989:133). 
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In Western Australia, apparently a similar need was seen for separating 
operations from policy. Within that separation, the district 
superintendents are clearly located in the operations rather than policy 
section. It is a position some are most unhappy with. For example: 
"The issue of input to policy really is frustrating. Our 
input is nil because our feedback to Central Office is or 
seems to be disregarded. I believe we must form and write 
policy guidelines related to operations because surely we 
are gaining 'expertise' in this division." 
"I think Central Office undervalues and underestimates the 
ability and potential of the district superintendency. No 
other group is both closer to where the 'rubber hits the 
road' and in touch with Central Office 'visions' and 
efforts." 
The Operations Directorate and Polley Development 
Until July 1990, the Schools Division in Central Office consisted of 
four directorates - Curriculum, Corporate Services, Human Resources, and 
Operations.3 Unlike the other directorates, the Operations Directorate 
had no discrete policy branch. By name and function it was concerned with 
operations. It consisted of four directors and the 29 superintendents. 
The four directors were members of the Schools Division Executive and 
therefore had a formal opportunity to participate in policy making. 
However, there is a widespread view among the superintendents that the 
directors of operations made little impact on policy, either inside or 
outside of Executive meetings. 
"The directors meet once a week and anyone can introduce a 
project at these (Executive) meetings which gives them a 
certain democratic nature but the chair is all powerful. 
We get minutes from these meetings." 
--------------------------------------------------------
3 Before July 1990, Central Office consisted of the Schools Division 
and the Policy and Resources Division. Recent changes have disbanded 
the two-divisional structure and replaced it with a four-divisional 
one. The old Operations Directorate is now located in the new 
Sch_ools Operation Division which consists of Operations, Curriculum, 
E~ecutive Support, and the Organisation Development Unit. 
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"The directors of operations are on the superintendents' 
side. There is no advantage for them to buck the 
superintendents. They are on Corporate Executive and have 
the power to argue for resources. But they get outgunned 
and fail to represent our interests." 
"Central Office has a low regard for superintendents. 
$15 million of Commonwealth money was spent without even 
consulting the directors of operations." 
"The superintendents had no input into the Corporate Plan 
(Schools Division). I made suggestions to my director of 
operations but he said, 'It's too late now because it has 
gone to the printers.' We should have discussed it if we 
are to implement it, if we are to feel involved with it." 
"They are trying but they haven't got it right yet. They 
get the feedback but don't incorporate it in policies. The 
directors of operations should be formulating policies but 
they aren't." 
"I was accused by principals of not handing feedback up the 
line and was told that line management won't work because 
the directors of operations don't give the feedback to 
Corporate Executive." 
"There was a feeling of a powerful clique in the Executive 
and that the directors of operations were not privy to that 
exclusive group." 
At Executive level, policy on curriculum and human resources comes 
through the directorates responsible for those two areas. It might be 
thought that because superintendents are responsible for supervising the 
formulation and implementation of school development plans in individual 
schools, then the directors of operations would generate policy guidelines 
for constructing those plans and monitoring school performance. However, 
that task has been performed by the Organisation Development Unit, a body 
which operates outside the four directorates and reports directly to 
Executlve.4 A number of superintendents explained the director of 
operation's position on this matter in these terms: 
"The directors of operations had no staff or funds to do it 
(policy development). No budget, no support staff, nothing." 
Responses 
4 "The ODU has reported to a director of operations. It probably 
reports to an executive director now." 
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"The directors of operations were kept 'barefoot and 
pregnant'. Apart from the limited resources they can filch 
from the Executive Support Branch, they each have a 
secretary. Policy development and generation requires time 
for thinking, investigation, writing - and many hands. I 
have more resources in my district office to do policy 
development than my director of operations had in Central 
Office." 
"These four August persons lack the arms and legs and time 
to be involved in real policy making. They rarely get 
above the administrative level. 11 
The superintendents visit Central Office mainly to attend senior 
officer meetings and meet with their directors of operations. The senior 
officer meetings are held about every seven weeks. So far they have been 
largely briefing sessions with the superintendents being 'talked at' by 
their superordinates or an expert on some new policy or programme. 
Apparently, there is very little debate or opportunity for meaningful 
comment from superintendents at these meetings. 
"At senior officer meetings we get documents and go into 
small groups and are asked, 'Do you agree with this or 
not?' But there isn't enough time to consider it. 11 
"The Executive are managerially naive. They should get 
groups, including superintendents, to give state of the 
nation reports. They don't know they are not telling us! 
They don't attempt to inform superintendents about 
curriculum initiatives." 
"The senior officer meetings are briefings to bring us up 
to date. But often we get stale information because of 
leaks. There is no debate because the decisions have 
already been made. It's hard to be told, 'You will do this 
and this'." 
"When something difficult comes up, like post compulsory 
schooling, we are told, 'We need to pick your brains,' 
which means 'We want you to agree with us'." 
"It's difficult to get consensus with 29 superintendents. 
Sometimes our recommendations are taken away and bounced 
off principals and then modified and you can get a bland 
melting down and that's not always the best thing. Then we 
are told, 'But you were consulted'. 11 
"The senior officer meetings are called SOB's - senior 
officer briefings. There is no managing upwards, just top 
down rhetoric." 
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"At the senior officer meetings, the directors of 
operations say nothing, except ( ..... ). They are not 
leaders. They don't make statements on directions. They 
don't make educational statements. They don't make a 
difference. "!I 
"Some speakers are frivolous at senior officer meetings. 
The overheads (transparencies) are poor, there are no 
documents, no proper information or feedback." 
"The history of these meetings is fascinating and 
significant. They started off with briefings from the 
Executive being a small part and the professional 
development of superintendents being a big part. Then we 
had a few bad ones and a joint committee of some Executive 
members and superintendents was formed to organise them. 
After awhile that committee was suddenly scrapped - no one 
knows why - and the meetings changed from being development 
to being briefing sessions and they became top down all the 
way."6 
Sometimes, on the day before or after senior officer meetings,7 the 
superintendents get together with their directors of operations. On these 
occasions, policy issues can be raised and discussed on a collegial and 
collaborative basis. Significantly, the four groups of superintendents 
meet separately, never collectively. Most of the sessions are devoted to 
policy clarification rather than policy development - though on this point 
there are perceived variations between the groups. 
"Our director of operations usually chairs the meeting but 
sometimes shares it around. It is up to the directors to 
say how often these meetings are held, what's on the 
Respo•aes 
!I "This comment falls to recognise who called these meetings and in 
most cases it wasn't the directors of operations. Also, agendas in 
most cases were not what the directions of operations wanted." 
& "All these comments highlight the communication/consultation 
problem in our organisation. If we asked principals we'd get the 
same response - it teachers, again the same response." 
7 "These meetings are becoming more appropriate to meet the needs of 
district superintendents and to enable more effective input/ 
feedback through the district superintendents." 
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agenda, and who presents what. There is a huge variation 
between groups. Our group moved ahead because of our 
director of operations. He gave us responsibility, got us 
on committees, and gave a good leadership model. Other 
directors of operations said, 'I'm not going to tell my 
superintendents what to do because they are professional'." 
"The director of operations meetings are wimpish - just 
talk - blanc mange - what we discuss doesn't go to 
Corporate Executive. ( ...... ) does what he wants. There's 
no consultation." 
"Most superintendents meet quarterly with their directors 
of operations on a one-to-one basis for the purpose of 
performance management and appraisal. These meetings are 
useful for our own personal professional development but 
not for offerring any input into policy. 
"Our input into the agenda is zero. The director of 
operations decides the agenda and whether we'll be able to 
contribute to policy making." 
"The director of operations' meetings deal with nuts and 
bolts issues; for example, any trouble in the districts, 
computers, the school fees debate. Sometimes we hold our 
hands up in horror and we have a debate about some issue 
and that is taken note of and reflected up to Executive." 
"Our director of operations was charged with developing 
regulations about school-based decision-making groups and 
had to deal with seven varieties of regulations. We 
debated the regulations ourselves in our group. It almost 
got to the final stage, then WACSSO had their say and it 
went back to square one. In that case we were able to 
influence policy." 
"With my director of operations there ls some scope for us 
to exercise educational leadership because he gave us a 
chance to contribute to a policy paper he was writing, to 
share ideas and use each other's ideas across the 
districts." 
A few superintendents are invited to sit on Central Office committees 
that do form policy. These provide, "a mechanism to have a real say, but 
you only get on them by invitation" and some superintendents are 
unclear about how many are invited. 
"I've made expressions of interest but I'm on no Central 
Office committee. I don't even know which superintendents 
are representing superintendents on committees. The 
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directors of operations haven't set up a structure for 
that. It's their responsibility. ".8 
Although the predominant view is that they do not have much opportunity 
for participating in policy making, some superintendents did say they were 
adequately consulted - at least on a number of issues. 
"The superintendents had a big input on post compulsory 
schooling policy, occupational health and welfare, lower 
secondary studies (the 160 hours requirement}, and the 
guidelines for school development plans." 
"The superintendents' policy domain is school development. 
We had an opportunity to provide input on the school 
development guidelines because there was a draft and we had 
a workshop on it. Those who complain are probably the same 
ones who complain they are too busy anyhow." 
"The School Development Plan Guidelines - we had input. 
The Schools Division Corporate Plan - we had input." 
(And, more obliquely} "Lots of documents fall off backs of 
trucks. We're not sure of the status of these. We told 
Executive to have one central distribution point - that if 
this is a policy or draft document then it has to have the 
stamp of the Corporate Executive on it. If it doesn't have 
that stamp then it's an opinion paper. That would avoid 
confusion as to whether a document is official or not. The 
Executive wants to manage and control by having a shortened 
line management - executive, director of operations, 
superintendent, principal. They keep trying to say that 
this is the only line. I'm saying it's not the only line 
that exists - because of gossip and documents that fall off 
backs of trucks." 
Most superintendents would reply to those claims by saying that their 
input is reactive, not proactive; they tend to be given drafts of policy 
documents to respond to rather than an opportunity to be in on the ground 
Responses 
s "I've seen a list - saw it in mid 1989." 
"Is it? Or, is it up to the district superintendents to show some 
initiative?" 
"It would appear to me that district superintendents are recruited 
for Central Office policy developing committees on their perceived 
expertise rather than to represent the body of superintendents." 
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floor.9 Furthermore, because these documents seem to be fait accomplis, 
the level of consultation is regarded as tokenism.to 
Some Options 
A range of options can be suggested in relation to the superintendents' 
feelings outlined in this chapter. One is to explore ways of 
strengthening the capacity of the Operations Directorate (or the new 
equivalent) to influence policy. For example, perhaps the Organisation 
Development Unit could become the formal policy branch of that directorate 
and function as the equivalent of the policy branches of the Curriculum 
and Human Resource Directorates (or the new equivalents).11 A second 
option involves superintendents forming their own professional association 
or institute to provide an effective voice for directly influencing 
policy. A third option is to examine the extent to which effective 
corporate management does in fact require the separation of operations 
from policy and then encourage superintendents to accept the consequences 
of the findings. 12 Of these three options, the superintendents had most 
to say about the second one. 
Reaponaea 
9 
10 
11 
12 
"I have received more information regularly than the various 
comments here suggest is the average." 
"Yes, I guess so. But it's sort of like saying that a swimmer 
drowned because he/she refused to swim;" 
"This has happened with the latest changes in Central Office." 
"Perhaps a fourth option is by communicating - by being informally 
political. I know there is a limit to this, but .... " 
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Superintendents Institute 
Before the Better Schools Report, the superintendents belonged to a 
Superintendents Institute. It provided a vehicle through which the 
superintendents could form and present a group opinion on matters of 
policy. Not all superintendents saw it as an influential body.13 
"The old Superintendents Institute was not effective. It 
was basically a senior officers' meeting, not an educational 
forum. It was gutless, just a Head Office briefing with a 
bit of an industrial arm." 
"Before (198 7) there were different types of 
superintendents - secondary general and subject 
superintendents, regional primary and bullding 
superintendents, and so on. The old Superintendents 
Institute therefore represented a cross section and the 
diffused power weakened it." 
"The superintendents had little input (before 1987). 
Individually they did but not as a group. The Institute 
was a professional arm - our bosses were part of it." 
Despite these perceptions, the Superintendents Institute was regarded 
by the post 1987 Executive as a threat to the management of restructuring 
- at least according to some superintendents. Consequently, they claim, 
steps were taken to render it inactive and prevent a new group 
forming.14 The sort of examples cited in support of this belief include 
the following. Since first appointed some three years ago, the 29 
superintendents have never met alone as a group with their own 
agenda.111 Their meetings have always been with other senior officers or 
Responses 
13 "The Institute was always supportive. Senior Officers were 
members." 
14 "Not really. Everyone was kept too busy." 
t!I "We met as a group for the first time on June 14, 1990, on the 
subject of the Memorandum of Agreement." 
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in small groups with a director of operations. In the early days of 
restructuring, these small groups met at separate venues. Moreover, the 
organisation of superintendents into four groups, each under a director of 
operations, was not on a geographical basis.16 As a result the groups 
could not form a sense of regional identity and organise themselves 
accordingly. In short, say the superintendents, the whole process has 
, been carefully managed to prevent them operating as a formal interest 
group and presenting a collective statement to the policy makers.17 
Typical comments were: 
"We meet as senior officers, not as superintendents. There 
is no forum for superintendents alone and that inhibits 
superintendents reviving the Superintendents Institute." 
"The Ministry wanted the new superintendents to be a part 
of the system, not a separate power base. It wanted the 
superintendents to have professional development rather 
than a professional association." 
"At the senior officer meetings the agenda ls determined by 
the Executive; it's done deliberately to prevent district 
offices developing power bases." 
"We have never ever met as a group of thirty 
superintendents and four directors of operations. We've 
only met as a director of operations group of eight or as a 
senior officers' group." 
"We used to meet (before 1987) once a month as a total 
primary superintendency. Whilst there were differences, 
there was a groupness. Now we meet separately in our 
director of operations' groups. There is no geographical 
rationale. The power bases are divided, it's deliberate." 
--------------------------------------------------------
Responses 
16 
17 
"I'm not sure whether a better geographical· relationship would 
have made any difference. It shouldn't have been necessary. 
Identity needs to emerge from policy matters and the contribution 
of district superintendents to policy formulation." [In their 
restructuring, N.S.W., S.A., and Victoria grouped their 
districts/clusters into regions/areas on a geographical basis. 
Their directors of operations, in the form of regional/area 
directors are located in the regional office, not Central Office 
as in W.A.) 
"Sounds paranoid to me." 
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"The Superintendents Institute represented the senior 
officers of the Education Department. Then all 
superintendent Jobs were abolished and existing people and 
others were invited to apply for 29 positions. The 
professional arm became controlled by people on high. It 
was a fear type thing. People went from permanent to 
acting and thought they may not get reappointed. So they 
became passive and didn't want to cross the management .. 
It's a matter of the past now. I wouldn't be surprised to 
see the professional arm form again. At present there is a 
series of informal networks which are not visible or 
recognised in a formal way." 
"There is a fear that the 29 superintendents will form a 
powerful group so a lot of deliberate strategies are 
employed to prevent the 29 getting together; for example, 
seven at one hotel, six at another place. Central Office 
makes sure we don't get together. If the 29 are got 
together, then it's for briefings, there's no scope for us 
to form a collective viewpoint on something and organise 
consensus. It's deliberately done and well done. We were 
told that the only way to get change is to keep everyone in 
a state of apprehension, to make everyone unsure. It 
worked but there would have been more acceptable, positive 
ways of making it work." 
Most superintendents would like to see that situation change. In their 
view, the Ministry need no longer feel threatened by the re-establishment 
of a superintendents instltute.1e Indeed for some of them the thrust 
behind such a move would come more from an interest in their own 
professional development than from any urge to form a pressure group. 
"A superintendents institute doesn't need to play power 
games. It would be used more for professional exchange." 
"The immediate threat of superintendents bucking the system 
has gone because superintendents realise power goes through 
the director of operations system so the Ministry won't 
oppose superintendents forming a professional association, 
but it will be mainly for professional development. 
Other superintendents pointed out that without an association of their 
own, they are industrially vulnerable. 
"We're under a five year contract. In two and half years 
times there may be a spill again." 
Reap0a11ea 
1e "Recent further moves have been made." 
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"We don't have an industrial arm to represent 
superintendents on salaries, etc. The old Superintendents 
Institute did. We are an isolated group within the public 
service; we have no say." 
"The top end (of the Ministry) are paranoid about us 
forming a power base. But we need a superintendents 
institute, not to shoot at the boss, but for a professional· 
association to protect our interests against the 
government. We wouldn't be having a shot at our boss. If 
its unprofessional why do doctors have a professional arm? 
Take one issue - superannuation. If we go collectively to 
the CSA they'd fight it for us but if we go individually 
they· won't." 
Clearly, then, not all of the superintendents' reasons for wanting some 
form of professional organisation relate to their interest in gaining a 
greater say in policy development. Nevertheless, a desire for more 
effective representation on decision making committees does form a major 
part of their case for establishing a formal association. 
"Now and again, the Ministry samples the views of 
superintendents but it's only tokenism because a 
representative superintendent speaks as an individual not 
as a formal superintendents' representative who is able to 
say, 'The superintendents feel this way'." 
"The directors of operations aren't on all committees and 
any one of them only represents one quarter of the 
superintendents anyway. So representation of the 
superintendency by the directors of operations is not a 
satisfactory arrangement." 
"It's easy to provide superintendents with the opportunity 
to have input. A list of all committees of interest can be 
circulated to superintendents. Then they can be asked to 
list all the things we want to be proactive on, to make our 
opinion known on. If I'm the representative for the 
superintendents on a committee I just fax all 
superintendents before a meeting and take the results to 
the meeting. Fax, collect, and collate. It requires a 
professional time commitment." 
"We should ensure that there is a superintendent on every 
Ministry committee, that a pairing system is organised to 
fill absences, and that individuals adopt a process to 
adequately represent the opinions of the superintendency. 
That kind of representation should be set in place by the 
directors of operations" 
A recent event represents a variation on some of these themes. Several 
months a~o (June 1990) the country superintendents organised a meeting for 
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themselves. The agenda related to business matters for the 
superintendency in country districts and focussed on interdistrict sharing 
and the cost effectiveness of operations. According to one participant: 
"It was essentially a business meeting, but the appetite 
for collegiate sharing of issues beyond district operations 
has resulted in a planned August meeting of this group." 
Closing Comments 
In the management of a two tier education system, superintendents 
essentially perform a control rather than leadership function; they are 
guardians, not philosopher kings. 19 By definition and by deed, the 
people who exert most influence are those who: determine the overall 
structure and function of the system; shape the dominant ideology and 
culture; make the rules; formulate the broad goals, objectives, 
priorities, performance indicators, and policies; and develop the long 
range corporate and strategic plans. Superintendents do very little of 
this. They are supervisors and custodians of change rather than 
architects and captains of change. 
Some superintendents have experienced difficulty coming to terms with 
what they see as a relegation of their role from a position of leadership 
to something less influential. A number of them described the process as 
involving a lengthy psychological adjustment. For example 
"I used to think, 'Why can't they make up their minds and 
tell us what our role is?' Then I realised it was too 
early for that and I became tolerant of the delay. Then I 
realised, 'Why do I need them to tell me?' The pieces of 
the puzzle were pre-determined in the Better Schools 
Responses 
19 "The principals in this District expect and accept leadership. 
We share ideas - develop a team approach - and it works." 
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Report. All one had to do was put them together. So I 
formed my own view and when I saw all the pieces come 
together I became comfortable. I accept my role now. I 
accept that creative leadership has been destroyed, though 
the principals still have it. I accept being a facilitator 
The biggest problem of the superintendent's role is 
the limited scope for creative leadership, though helping 
principals with their school development plan may provid~ 
creative leadership for me. I' 11 have to wait and see." 
Other superintendents, from the beginning of their appointment, had no 
problem accepting that they were role takers rather than role makers. 
"I need to know my director of operations' goals to help 
work out my goals and strategies. It's more or less a 
matter of saying to him, 'I'll try to accommodate you in 
achieving your goal. You're my boss'." 
"All the new superintendents are in the Ministry mode. The 
older ones disagree. The result is factionalisation." 
"The Ministry as an organisation has a right to set the 
parameters and superintendents have to accept the role as 
defined by the management. Superintendents know what they 
are applying for. If I hadn't liked it, I wouldn't have 
applied. In 1987 the superintendents applied for the job 
blind because there was no clear defined role - the top 
wasn't telling them and schools expected them to be like 
the old days."16 
The next chapter documents a list of eight key accountablllty areas that 
the superintendents formulated for themselves. Interestingly, the list 
contains virtually nothing related to policy development; the focus is 
overwhelmingly on operatlons.20 
Given the tensions outlined in this chapter, it is appropriate to end 
not with Plato but with Pericles of Athens. When speaking for the Open 
Society in about 430 B.C. he said, "Although only a few may originate a 
policy we are all able to judge it." 
--------------------------------------------------------
Responses 
20 
"Why? Have we been brainwashed?" 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SCHOOL TIER: DIFFERENCES THAT CAUSE DIFFICULTIES 
Devolution gave schools more freedom to be self-managing and more 
responsibility to demonstrate accountability to the Ministry and the local 
community. It also gave principals the job of managing the implementation 
of those changes. These moves reflect two modern maxims: "let the 
managers manage; make them accountable." The reforms did more than 
simply charge principals with additional managerial tasks. They amplified 
the prlnclpal's role as change agent and instructional leader - a role 
made particularly necessary by the removal of superintendents from the 
business of supervising teachers and providing curriculum expertise. 1 
Within the context of these changes, it can be argued that the 
superintendent's job ls predomlnently twofold: to support and audit 
schools; and to support and appraise princlpals.2 Prior to 1990, 
superintendents were prevented from focussing on these roles by factors 
such as: the need to get district offices established; industrial action 
in schools; and some uncertainty within the superintendency about what 
was really expected of them. Those obstacles have now receded into the 
Responses 
1 · Superintendents were not completely removed from direct contact 
with classroom teachers: "merit promotion and unsatisfactory 
reports are just some examples of direct involvement." Another 
superintendent said, "It ls interesting that the CEO has brought 
the Curriculum areas under the Operations mantle in the latest 
restructuring." 
2 "I find it difficult to see the relationship between the word 
'support' and the separation of the district superintendent from 
the district office as outlined on pages 16-20 earlier." 
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background. There seems to be a common understanding and agreement among 
superintendents that their role consists of the following tasks and time 
allocation: 
Key Accountability Areas For District Superintendents 
1. Ensures that effective audit and review processes are in place 
in schools so as to achieve educational outcomes consistent 
with Ministry priorities and policies and community 
expectations (25-50%).3 
2. Ensures the effective performance management of school 
principals, including promotion by merit (25%). 
3. Ensures the effective and efficient operation of the District 
Education Office (5-10%). 
4. Ensures that procedures are in place for the effective 
resolution of conflict (5-10%). 
5. Ensures the effective and efficient allocation of resources 
within the school district (5%). 
6. Ensures that Ministry policies and other significant items of 
information are effectively communicated to schools, and that 
appropriate feedback is provided to Central Office regarding 
the functioning, climate and emerging issues within schools 
(5%). 
7. Ensures the Ministry is effectively represented in the local 
community (5%). 
8. Participates in performance management and professional 
development with the Director of Operations (5%). 
This list was formulated by two groups of superintendents last year during a 
two day retreat at El Caballo Blanco. They did so partly by modifying the 
public service position data form. The major items are numbers one and 
two. Item one covers the support and audit of schools, as does part of 
items four and six. Two covers the support and appraisal of principals. 
The other items collectively add up to as little as one fifth of the 
--------------------------------------------------------
Responses 
3 
"The way this is worded, it seems that superintendents don't audit 
and review but only set up processes so that they can occur. I'm 
not, and never have been, in favour of this document." 
39 
superintendent's work. Three and five cover the audit of the district 
office referred to on page 18. The second part of item six covers the 
superintendent's role in policy making referred to in Chapter Two. Seven 
and eight are reminders that superintendents work for the centre tier. 
On the basis of the superintendents' experience and observations over 
the past two and half years, a number of issues can be identified in 
relation to their support and audit functions. This chapter outlines 
those issues. There ls no need to analyse what the functions involve; 
that has already been done in the recent Memorandum of Agreement and in 
material produced by the Organisation Development Unit. Also, an even 
more detailed set of practical guidelines should emerge from a pilot study 
currently being conducted by the Ministry entitled the 'Demonstrating 
Accountability Project'. 
Internal versus External Review 
Superintendents face the problem of having to carry out an auditing 
role in a context where, although industrially schools have agreed to 
educational auditing, the intellectual argument for that role has still 
not been comprehensively won - or understood. Some principals are not 
convinced that external monitoring of their school's performance is 
necessary.4 They point out that universities and TAFE colleges have 
been allowed to manage themselves but are not made accountable. They know 
that senior high schools in Western Australia before 1987 were excluded 
Responses 
4 "Particularly in large secondary schools or with recognised, top 
performing principals." 
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from triennial inspections by regional superintendents and operated 
without external reviews. They are aware that in Victoria there are no 
district superintendents or external audit agencies such as exist in South 
Australia, New South Wales, and New Zealand. They question wnere the push 
for educational auditing ls coming from because they have run their 
schools for years without complaint from the local community. And they 
believe that while periodic public attacks on levels of literacy and 
numeracy may be allayed by the Demonstrating Accountability Project, the 
effect of the superintendents' audits will be negligible. Several 
comments by superintendents capture the viewpoint of these principals and 
indicate that even among the superintendency there are reservations about 
the efficacy and necessity of external auditing. 
"Where is the demand for audit coming from? What are we 
going to get out of auditing that will reassure the 
community? In the past the community never got any more 
information than it gets now." 
"Provided we produce quality principals and good curriculum 
leadership sense, then I don't think we need any greater 
assurances about student outcomes." 
"Is auditing a straw man? It was redundant for decades. 
It's now a fetish. How long will it last?" 
Unconvinced principals regard auditing more as a mechanism for managing 
change than for increasing community confidence in educational standards. 
Consequently they see superintendents, not as agents of public 
accountability, but as instruments of centralist control. For industrial 
reasons, these principals will comply with the requirements of educational 
auditing, but not wholeheartedly. That will add to the difficulties 
confronting superintendents. It would help if more was done to win the 
intellectual argument for external monitoring and create a climate of 
acceptability within which the work of the superintendents could flourish. 
For their part, most superintendents accept the need for educational 
auditing, even if not unconditionally. 
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"I accept audit because it is necessary to give principals 
feedback." 
"Once the principals are competent and committed to self 
evaluation, then the superintendents can withdraw. But 
there'll still be the need for accountabllity." 
"If we had to choose, 50% of the superintendents would go 
for audit and 50% would go for educational leadership. The 
old primary superintendents would go for audit because 
that's their background and the old subject superintendents 
would go for leadership. "!I 
"Auditing will be negotiated between superintendents and 
principals. It will be a shared thing, collegial. We 
always knew that would be our job." 
"Auditing doesn't worry me providing I have other jobs like 
human relations type things; so long as I'm not an HMI or 
just operating from a filing cabinet in the back of the 
car." 
"Schools have to be audited, but we should do it in a 
professional way." 
"If we don't audit, then self-determining schools won't 
survive." 
"I am the agent of accountabllity. I represent the 
Ministry." 
School Consultant versus System Auditor 
In South Australia and New South Wales, the district superintendent 
provides a consultancy service to help schools conduct internal reviews of 
their performance. External reviews of schools are carried out by 
independent panels under the leadership of a central education review 
unit. In Western Australia, the external review is conducted by the same 
person who helps schools with their internal review - the district 
superintendent. 
--------------------------------------------------------
Responses 
!I "What about the 30% new superintendents?" 
"Wow!! What an unfounded generalisation." 
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Clearly, the West Australian model is cheaper,6 and it allows for an 
educational audit of each school every year. In South Australia and New 
South Wales, schools receive a three day visit by a team of external 
reviewers only once every four or five years. Annual, or even biennial, 
visits would require a massive increase in the size of the external review 
unit. Apart from the expense, the sheer size of the expanded unit would 
convey overtones of heavy central control. - something inimical to 
devolution. 
There is another advantage of the West Australian model. The 
integration of consultancy with auditing allows district superintendents 
to monitor schools in a more ongoing, developmental, collegial, formative, 
and remedial manner than can be achieved by a central audit and review 
agency. Superintendents are aware of these advantages. 
"Thirty superintendents accepted the role assuming their 
job was more formative than summative. If auditing ls 
summative then lt is potentially creating a higher level of 
risk because schools will have done things before the 
judgements are made and 'preventative medicine' can't be 
practised. If you know the history of the patient, then 
that collectively ls the audit. It's a lot easier to deal 
with little issues if they are dealt with on an ongoing 
basis. It's hard to suddenly undo big aggregated issues." 
"As data is collected, if it's given to superintendents 
progresssively rather than at the end of the year, then 
it's better because schools can make adjustments before it 
gets to be too late." 
"With auditing the school development plan, each visit ls 
monitoring. If I'm coming in as a part of ongoing support 
and consultation, then the end of year audit is only a 
formality." 
"To carry out the audit and review role, I'll be ln schools 
more. It ls possible to decrease the judgemental and 
negative terms by having them negotiated and shared. I'm 
Responses 
' "This ls apparent with the publication of the percentage the W.A. 
Government allocates to education; that ls, much less than other 
states." 
-~/ 
I 
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there not as a policeman but in a positive supportive role 
to help achieve objectives. As a bottom line I might have 
to say, 'These problems need addressing.' But there won't 
be any surprises and we'll develop common strategies to 
address them and use some district resources. It's hard to 
convince principals that they stand to gain, not lose, by 
this process. However, if someone is not doing the right 
thing, then I shouldn't back off, and I can't exclude the 
old time hardliners." 
The Western Australian model, however, contains a potential danger. If 
superintendents play a consultancy role during the formulation stage of 
school development plans, their objectivity may be compromised when it 
comes to endorsing them. A similar concern existed in New Zealand before 
1988 because the department's inspectors had advisory and regulatory roles 
which were sometimes in conflict. Evidently an inspector was required to 
approve the organisational outline of a school and then inspect that school 
and report on its programmes and educational outcomes. "The same inspector 
may also have run in-service training courses or been called upon by the 
principal for advice and guidance. However, the educational outcomes may 
have been influenced by deflciences in the inspector's advice or by 
weaknesses in the organisation outline she or he approved" (Picot 1988:30). 
Individual schools may not see this conflict as being detrimental to 
their interests because, unlike appraising principals for merit promotion, 
superintendents are not required to rank schools on a graduated scale of 
1-5. Satisfying community demands for accountability, though, is another 
matter. A problem may arise if public and professional confidence in the 
auditing process ls weakened by a perception that the superintendent's 
objectivity is compromised by having to simultaneously perform "advisory 
and regulatory roles." 
One way around this conflict is to restrict the superintendent's role to 
that of either auditing or providing consultation. Another is for 
superintendents to perform both roles but limit the support function to 
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providing principals with information, clarification, and materials on 
Ministry policy: essentially this is the stance taken in the Memorandum of 
Agreement. A third option is to ensure that full consultation with 
principals occurs in a fashion that does not leave the superintendent 
responsible for the outcome. For example, according to one superintendent: 
"The functions of educational leadership and audit can be a 
contradiction - like an accountant auditing his own books. 
If I work with a principal to construct a framework to 
audit, then I risk basically auditing myself. My problem 
was: how could I audit what I'd helped to structure 
because there would be a conflict of interests. I would be 
disposed to positively audit because a negative audit would 
be a condemnation of myself. So I reversed it - principals 
made the decisions and had the power. My role was to 
influence those decisions. That inverted the usual picture 
people had and made me feel better about auditing because 
the principal made the decisions. I said, 'You can do it 
that way but are you prepared for these consequences'. I 
pointed out that they had freedom to choose but not freedom 
to choose the consequences. The process of auditing then 
became a simple one and was not a conceptual problem of 
auditing myself." 
Professional Development versus Performance Appraisal 
Most superintendents in Western Australia agree that part of their job 
is to ensure "the effective performance management of school principals, 
including promotion by merit." 
Performance management encompasses professional development and 
performance appraisal. Insofar as principals make or break a school, the 
level of support they receive and the monitoring of their work have always 
been important. The Better Schools Report bestowed an added sense of 
urgency to the delivery of those services. It made schools the primary 
units of change and principals the lynchpin in the new structure. 
Consequently the work of superintendents in supervising principals occupies 
an important place in the new system. It also presents a number of 
problems. 
/ 
/ 
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The Picot Report claimed that the role of adviser and the role of 
assessing performance can be in conflict and should therefore be conducted 
separately. It argued along these lines. Superintendents are required to 
give advice to principals - but these principals are subsequently visited 
by the same superintendent for an appraisal leading to the issue of a 
personal report. Because the personal report is vital to their chances of 
winning promotion, principals feel reluctant to admit to deficiences about 
their leadership when these concerns could later be reflected in the 
personal report made by the superintendent.7 The less principals 
disclose their real difficulties, the less the superintendent can provide 
real support. A number of superintendents alluded to a tension within the 
dual role of supporter and assessor. 
"The superintendent's role is developmental, not 
judgemental - though superintendents will say to a weak 
principal, 'Go and pull up your socks, do courses, or we'll 
sack you'." 
"An adverse report could be used to settle a conflict of 
interests with a principal. But if principals know this is 
a possibility will they be up front at the beginning in 
declaring goals, needs etc at a performance management 
interview? Will they take risks or play it safe and not 
open up? The old system was a game of hide and seek. The 
principals would hide their inadequacies and say to the 
inspector, 'Find them if you can'. Now the superintendent 
can say to prin,:;·:,::P..ls. 'If you have inadequacies declare 
them and I'll heip you, but if you fail I'll have to take 
that into account.' In the old system the superintendent 
didn't help principals overcome inadequacies." 
"There ls a conflict between developing principals and 
appraising them. The principal has the same problem with 
his staff." 
"Superintendents build up the self esteem of principals by 
being encouraging and not pointing out weaknesses. If you 
are honest at the beginning and tell a principal, 'You're 
fairly weak', the principal might lose heart. If you lie 
and say 'You're strong', and the principal fails at the 
end, then the principal feels misled." 
--------------------------------------------------------
Responses 
7 "The smarter ones realise they get 'brownie points' by 
successfully solving problems. So a few get set up and 
solved very effectively." 
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"The principals need pastoral care. Some have poor houses, 
wives in Perth, and get sick. 'Phey need the superintendent 
for support so in a way I'm the parent of 25-30 kids 
principals who need some TLC and who need to be constantly 
patted on the back. There needs to be more in the field of 
liaison to get to know them. But it's difficult because we 
have to write a report on them for promotion and the new 
performance management system. That will force 
superintendents to relinquish the pastoral care role 
because we have to audit the principals. We're human too. 
We like the pastoral care role. That's why the Executive 
thought of bringing us back to Central Office - so we don't 
get too close to the principals, so we can be impartial. 11 
Another type of tension can arise when the same person has to be both 
supporter and assessor. Self-determining schools require self-determining 
principals.8 To achieve that objective, the superintendent/principal 
relationship must not be chara.cterised by paternalism and dependence. As 
one superintendent explained: 
"The old system bred principals who said, 'Tell me what to 
do and I'll do it to perfection and therefore aren't I a 
good principal'. Under the new system, principals are not 
supposed to be told what to do; there are to be no 
clones. n 
But in practice, the superintendent is still seen as both advisor and 
judge. Consequently, 
"Principals ask, 'Give me a list of deficits,' because then 
they tick them off and say, 'I'm a top operator,' and they 
twist my arm to give the A+ mark. 11 
These tensions9 do not arise if the superintendent/principal 
relationship ls collegial, non-threatening, and characterised by openness 
Responses 
e "I would argue that a self-determining principal is an obstruction. 
Self-determining schools require a principal who can facilitate and 
guide the process." 
"Self-determining schools do not require self-determining principals. 
In fact if we have self-determining principals we may have principals 
d~ctating what he/she wants. This is far from the expressed 
philosophy of self-determining schools." 
9 "Th,, same dichotomy occurs with the performance management of district 
sup'erintendents and the directors of operations." 
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and trust. According to performance management ithe.olj,tJiqthat'' type of 
relationship can be developed if both parties reach: e,~~!J:r~.ri;~ment on the 
· o,tw ,2;ih ··· • 
principal's job goals, performance outcomes, inserviceI;;,,fr.ailhli,rrg1 needs, and 
: f<i ;tll)'R i;i:; 
the level of support required to meet those needs. ,A:ppr.ais.al then takes 
place in terms of outcomes rather than inputs: 
~:, '.; jt-f! -~ 'i}t .--,, : 
achieving performance objectives rather than the princ],pJnsf,t',behaviour, 
personality, or occupational character traits; 
' )<: t'I'<! : . 
or, in ter.msli:P'.1\ ''the 
extent to which the principal has been able to raise the·:performance of 
the school through effective problem solving rather than wh~t the 
• , 1,,_:;.; 
principal actually did" (Organisation Development Unit 1989:9). In this 
way the process of supporting and appraising principals parallels the 
process of supporting and auditing schools. However, as me.ntioned 
earlier, there is a crucial difference. Whereas superintendents only have 
to declare the performance of schools to be satisfactory or · .. ' 
unsatisfactory, they have to rank the performance of principals. applying 
for promotion on a five point scale. Since the mark makes a significant 
difference to an applicant's career prospects, the non-judgemental, 
'''f;, 
non-threatening nature of the superintendent/principal relationship is 
placed at risk. 
·\~Jr ~ 
Lack of time, say the superintendents, also impedes the deyelopment of 
a collegial relationship with principals based on openness ~ndtttrust.10 
They consider that a satisfactory performance management programQle for 
25-30 principals can not be supervised by one superintendent. Apparently 
research recommends about eight as the maximum. For that :reason the 
superintendents believe directors of operations are able to make 
- -- - - ---- - - - - ---- - --- - ----- - - ----- - -- - -- - ----- ''·" a·· .' - ---
Reapoases 
10 "Has anyone analysed the amount of time a country dlstrictr 
superintendent spends in a vehicle or plane? Often in our . own 
time!" 
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performance management work for them,. though even then there are some 
reservations. 
"Another part of the cultural change is performance 
management based on the public service model: goal 
setting, personal development, ascertaining needs in 
relation to school development. But it depends on a 
superordinate-subordinate relationship of one to five. It 
works with the director of operations and seven 
superintendents but not with one superintendent and 28 
principals." 
"The good book say 6-8 maximum. I have to work with 30 
principals on performance management." 
"Middle management theory says the supervisory ratio should 
be 1 :8. Superintendents have a ratio of 1 :30 schools. 
That makes our work superficial and inadequate and it will 
remain that way until an alternative has been found." 
"I'll be canvassing my own staff and principals for 
feedback on my performance. The director of operations 
won't have time. He's off site, the same as I'm off site 
for the principals." 
"The performance management system is new. It won't work 
in the true sense however because my director of operations 
won't know me well enough. He'll be battling to see me 
once in action each year." 
The requirement to appraise teachers as well as principals for merit 
promotion exacerbates the shortage of time. There is an expectation among 
the superintendency that reforms to the merit promotion system will 
relieve them of having to inspect and report on staff other than 
principals. and that more of the onus will be placed on applicants to 
establish their own case for promotion. 
"Last year (1989) one superintendent had more reports to 
write than days to do it in. The sets of applications come 
in waves. You have to complete one set by a deadline 
before the next set comes in. It takes at least a day for 
each person who applies. It's okay when assessing 
principals because we see them through professional 
development but with teachers it's more difficult because 
we haven't seen them and we have to verify all the evidence 
and claims made." 
"Superintendents assess principals applying for promotion. 
It's time consuming and lacks comparabUity and 
moderation. How my colleagues do lt in another district 
I've no idea. We get no feedback from the Promotion 
Board'.; How does the Board assess my rating of principals?" 
I 
r 
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"Superintendents can't do both - auditing and merit 
promotion of all principals and. teachers. The 
superintendents should only write reports on principals. 
But if principals did the superintendent's role of writing 
reports on teachers then the principal would become 
overloaded and would have to be relieved of some duties. 
Perhaps no one should write reports and we could do what 
the public service does and applicants could· write their · 
own reports." 
"The projected percentages are 30% accountability and 5% 
promotion by merit. At present the figures are reversed. 
I spend 30% on promotion by merit and 5% on 
accountability. The number of applications should be 
restricted. We need filters and smarter merit promotion 
based on a performance management programme." 
The tensions that arise when the same person acts in an advisory and 
regulatory capacity are not confined to superintendents.11 Some people 
argue that they apply equally to the principal/teacher and teacher/pupil 
relationships. However, is the comparison valid? Are superintendents 
supposed to be instructional leaders of principals in the same way that 
principals and teachers are for their subordinates?12 Should the 
professional development component of performance management· be mandatory, 
or, supervised by superintendents only on request from the principals? If 
mandatory, does it then become more an instrument of Central Office 
control rather than professional development? Within a system of self 
determining schools, should not principals be allowed - indeed, encouraged 
- to choose their own provider of professional development? 
--------------------------------------------------------
Reapoaaea 
u "This 'friend and enemy' distinction does not flt my experience. 
The schools accept my dual role. A friend of mine ls in the 
central audit unit in New Zealand. She has some grave concerns · 
because with the disappearance of the district superintendent 
there is no system support at all for principals." 
12 "I question the term 'instructional' rather than 'educational 
leadership.' It worries me that if superintendents are seen to 
lose their educational expertise they lose their credibility too." 
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Principal Perfonnance versus School Perfonnance 
Should superintendents assess the performance of principals in terms of 
the performance of their schools?13 If the school development plan 
fails has the principal failed? Those questions divide the 
superintendency and the broader educational community. 
Advocates for keeping the appraisal of principals and schools separate 
ar~ue that principals should not be held accountable for outcomes beyond 
their control. And, they say, the key factors affecting the success of a 
school are outside the control of principals. For instance, principals 
have little control over the type of pupils who attend their school and 
the quality of teachers apppointed to their staff. Furthermore they are 
stuck with a wide range of centrally determined policies, frameworks, and 
regulations that shape the operation and outcomes of their schools. To 
take a small example: how can principals be held accountable for the 
image of their school in the community if regulations prevent them making 
school uniforms compulsory? 
'Separationists' point out that the complexity of some school 
communities makes it very difficult to assess whether the school is 
successful or not. However, they say, that does not prevent the 
performance of principals in these schools bt:!ing assessed. Supervisors 
who observe principals in action can rate various aspects of their work 
without knowing details of the school's performance. For instance, the 
Ministry's merit promotion application form asks referees to do just 
Re•ponaes 
13 "I don't believe we are assessing. We are auditing the quality 
of the planning in the schools to meet the perceived needs. 
This includes the audit of the use of resources and the 
development of participatory decision making." 
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that on a wide range of points under the headings of communication, 
decision-making, educational leadership, and management skilis. 
'Separationists' also argue that Judging principals by the success of 
the school development plan will encourage them to take on an unhealthy 
sense of personal ownership of that plan instead of trying to foster 
genuine community involvement. For example, one superintendent said that 
in his district, a lot of time was spent during principals' conferences 
exploring the notion of performance appraisal and trying to get principals 
to see that their role was distinct from the school development plan. 
"Some of them, in fact most of them, saw themselves as 
being appraised in terms of the success or failure of the 
school development plan. If that was the case, it was 
logical that they would tend to want the school development 
plan to be a statement that they had created and made - in 
short, if they were to hang for something, then it had to 
be something they wanted to hang for. It became clear to a 
lot more of the principals that the school development plan 
is a statement made by and belonging to the school and 
performance appraisal is about appraising the role that the 
principal has in managing the school development plan." 
On the other hand, those in favour of appraising principals in terms of 
their school's performance argue that assessment should be based on 
outputs, not inputs. If that does not occur then principals will be 
judged on the trappings of management rather than on their efficiency and 
effectiveness;H principals will be judged on things like dress, zeal, 
industry, and leadership style rather than on whether they are making a 
significant difference to the operational performance of the school in 
achieving its stated objectives. That, in turn, could lead to bizarre 
judgements equivalent to: "The operation was successful but the patient 
-----· ---------------------------------------------------
Respoaaes 
14 "You can be fabulously efficient and effective at completing tasks 
which are totally irrelevant to the school's purposes. Unless 
that is recognised, principals will be Judged on their competency 
to carry out tasks rather than their contribution to the stated 
educational outcomes of the school" (a reference group member). 
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died"; and, "The teacher performed beautifully but the pupils learned 
nothing. "1!1 It could lead also to the promotion of those who "look good 
rather than produce the goods." 
Moreover, the principal is the chief executive officer of the school 
and has ultimate on-site responsibility for how well the school is doing. 
As such, he or she can not escape the requirement that, "Those who 
exercise pQwer and responsibility on behalf of others must expect to have 
their performance monitored and be accountable for what they have 
achieved" (Picot 1988:60). Accountability here does not mean being 
subjected to judgemental assessment or being held responsible for factors 
outside the principal's control. It means being able to account for what 
happened. It means being able to show that decisions to improve a 
school's performance were made in a rigorous fashion - that is, "based on 
proper monitoring, with appropriate benchmarks, following a collaborative 
problem solving process, and with due regard to Ministry policy" 
(Organisation Development Unit 1989:3). In other words, accountability 
does not mean assessing how well schools solve problems but how they go 
about generating strategies to solve their problems - a process for which 
principals can legitimately be held responsible. Thus, say some 
superintendents: 
Respoaaes 
1!1 "True up to a point. But it begs questions. The operation on 
the bowel for the removal of a cancerous growth was immaculate 
and successfully achieved. Unfortunately the patient died ·Of a 
massive stroke. That is not a bizarre judgement. It's a fact. 
I guess the point is to distinguish between that which a 
principal/teacher can and cannot be held accountable for. I 
have trouble seeing how a teacher performing beautifully could 
have a class full of kids who learned nothing. Even a teacher 
performing badly can be credited with teaching kids something -
even if it's all negatives" 
I 
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"Performance management of principals, and school 
development plan support, complement each other; they 
can't be done in isolation. The principals know I'm 
appraising them all the time." 
"You can't divorce principal appraisal from school 
appraisal. 
"Auditing has introduced another card into the pack. 
Principals now get brownie points for making mistakes, for 
being up front with the problem and showing they know how 
to solve it." 
"If outcomes haven't changed, the superintendent doesn't 
declare the school inefficient but encourages the school to 
question the method of getting there. That could be 
compromised by principals seeking merit promotion; that 
is, principals could see failure of school outcomes as 
being judged as failure as a principal." 
Secondary versus Primary Schools 
Most superintendents consider that their support and review roles are 
more difficult to carry out in secondary than in primary schools. 
Tradition is partly responsible here. Under the pre-1987 structure, 
senior high schools had little to do with the regional offices. The 
secondary principals tended to deal directly with the Director General and 
the Director of Schools while the senior masters operated through the 
subject superintendents from Head Office. It was the primary schools that 
used the regional resources and were triennially inspected by the 
superintendents. 
"Primary principals objected to the extra duties mainly 
because of the fear of being found wanting. They weren't 
worried about the workload. It was the anxiety of being 
incompetent because they were dependent on the regional 
superintendent and were constrained and the superintendents 
shouldered the responsibility. Now they are seeing they do 
have freedom and they are less resistant to being audited 
than secondary principals." 
"The secondary principals were not accountable because they 
had no triennial inspections. They did their own thing." 
"The senior high schools buck more because they are not 
used to it." 
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"Previously senior high school principals had direct access 
to the Director General. They were disdainful to subject 
superintendents. Some senior high school principals are 
still anti-superintendents because they doubt our 
expertise." 
During the early '80s, secondary generalist superintendents were 
appointed to regional offices. Apparently, they made little impact 
because their role was less defined, understood, and accepted than the 
primary superintendents. According to a reference group member: "When 
the secondary generalist superintendents were appointed no one knew what 
they were going to do. They had to eke out a role for themselves. One of 
them told me that they were roving confidants for first year teachers. 
They would roll up to a school, announce their presence, and wait for 
teachers to come and talk to them. Their role should have been more 
active. The district superintendent role is a bit like a grander 
secondary generalist superintendent." The present superintendents would 
agree with some, if not all of that statement. 
"The notion of the generalist superintendent - secondary, 
was introduced and seen as equivalent to primary 
superintendents but its relationship to the subject 
superintendents was never defined. It was a nebulous pot." 
"The secondary generalist superintendent came out about 
1980-1. No one seemed to know their role. They felt a 
sense of frustration in that teachers felt they owed their 
loyalty to subject superintendents - they had the power and 
expertise." -
The current district structure does little to attract the interests of 
secondary schools. Most districts have only a few senior high schools and 
some as few as one. Therefore, secondary principals often find district 
principals' conferences less collegial and relevant than do their primary 
counterparts.•' 
--------------------------------------------------------
Reapoaaea 
1, "Jn country districts, secondary principals are newly promoted and 
I / eager for training." 
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Senior high schools have less need for superintendents to monitor their 
performance than is the case with primary schools; they have inbuilt 
auditing mechanisms in the form of TEE results and SEA subject moderation 
and certification.11 
Secondary schools are large, less child-centred, and more fragmented by 
subject departments. Those characteristics hq,ve impeded progress on 
school development in the past. For example, a reference group member 
pointed out that, "Secondary generalist superintendents were based on the 
notion that there was an entity about a school and their role was to help 
find and enhance that entity. The problem was most secondary schools 
didn't have a distinct entity, they only had subject entities." Similar 
comments were made by the superintendents. 
"The primary schools were used to being treated as a school 
as a whole. They put up no resistance to school 
development because they were on the verge of getting it in 
place. The secondary schools are fragmented because the 
different faculties make it hard to get school vision, 
purpose, priorities. They used to be funded direct from 
Head Office." 
"The high schools are behind on school development compared 
with the primary schools. They used to have subject 
superintendents. Now they say the district office staff 
don't provide much. We have 7 .5 staff, of whom only 4.5 
are directly available to schools, so we can't match what 
they used to have." 
For a number or reasons, superintendents have more difficulty 
establishing their credentials in senior high schools. Secondary 
principals tend to have higher status in the community and more subject 
--------------------------------------------------------
Responses 
11 "Only for Upper School. What about Years 8-10?" 
"I doubt the efficacy of this. What careful analysis is done? By 
whom? With what results? Even the data can be rationalised away 
given a close knowledge of the events." 
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. specialist academic qualifications than their primary counterparts. They 
are less convinced that superintendents can offer much in the way of 
relevant experience and expertise - particularly when the superintendents 
are recruited from primary backgrounds.18 This is not to say that 
superintendents accept that judgement. 
"High schools think they are superior because they are 
larger, have more money, and kids doing Year 12 exams. 
They have a nonchalent, superior manner, and large egos, 
and see themselves as the most important cog in the 
system. They can affect the culture of the district." 
"I haven't any high school subject expertise but I have 
process skills and management expertise so I don't have any 
conflicts or hang ups about going into secondary schools." 
"The only way to keep in touch with high schools is to sit 
in with subject departments. I'll go to fortnightly social 
studies meetings at (. .... ) senior high school to find out 
how a faculty gets access to the school grant and fits in 
with school priorities. But this is not a big point. I 
have more difficulty keeping in touch with the Ministry." 
"I go into classrooms for teacher morale purposes - to 
provide teachers with the link they believe they lost; 
that is, someone other than the principal to discuss their 
own performance and aspirations with. This only happens at 
the primary level; I get into every primary classroom but 
never below the level of senior teachers in high schools." 
"The power of the superintendent has changed from overt to 
infiuential. The span of control has increased. It goes 
from K-12. In the old days it was from 1-7. That tests 
one's credibility, particularly for primary superintendents 
when they talk with senior high school principals. Because 
of our lack of expertise we have to shut up. "te 
iteaPoDaea 
1e "Generally this is true. But it depends a lot on the district 
superintendent's style. There is a district 
superintendent/secondary school agenda; the district 
superintendent has to define it and be assertive." 
"I disagree. I have a totally primary background but find high 
schools are ready to discuss their development and the planning 
process." 
/ 
57 
Closing Comment 
Clearly, the role of the superintendent can vary according to how the 
issues outlined in this chapter are resolved. Further variation will 
occur if the issues are settled on a district by district basis rather 
than in a way that applies uniformly across the board. That raises the 
question of how the interests of a system of self determining schools are 
best served on this matter - by variation or by uniformity? Two 
superintendents gave answers to that question. 
"At least in the initial stage I would suspect that 
variation was the way to go. Perhaps the time is now ripe 
for some uniformity." 
"Both will exist. Variation will exist because of 
interpersonal links and variations in superintendent/ 
principal relationships. Uniformity will exist in terms 
of: audit and review happening, time-lines, Ministry 
policy and directives, compliance with Memorandum of 
Agreement implementation, and references to common 
'standard' goals." 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TIERS 
Ideally, a system of self-determining schools is characterised by unity 
within diversity. That is, all schools accept a basic minimum set of 
centrally determined core values, goals, and priorities, but beyond that 
they exercise freedom to develop their own structures and sub-cultures. 
When those conditions prevail, Central Office and schools work in harmony 
with each other and a two tier system becomes pluralistic rather than 
monolithic in nature. 
Over the past three years in Western Australia relations between the 
two tiers have not always been marked by mutual trust, respect, and 
support. Instead of peaceful co-existence there have been significant 
periods of suspicion, rancour, and conflict. The bases of the discord are 
historical, industrial, and ideological. They bring into question the 
possibility of ever reaching the ideal of unity within diversity. They 
also make certain demands upon the role of the superintendent. 
Historical Basis of Division 
No one should have been surprised by the radical reforms proposed in 
the Better Schools Report. They were clearly foreshadowed in the events 
leading up to 1987. The press for school-based declsion-making groups had 
been fostered by the Australian Schools Commission during the '70s, the· 
Teachers Union campaign for democratic decision making in the '80s, the 
Beazley Report in 1984, and the Education Department pilot studies on 
/ /' 
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community participation in 1985. The progression towards full scale merit 
promotion began in the early '80s and was pushed along by the Beazley 
Report. The same can be said for principals determining the permanency of 
new teachers. During the l 980's, Annual Reports of the Education 
Department announced moves to promote more corporate management. The 
first restructuring of Head Office took place in 1986. The well 
publicised work of the Functional Review Committee in reorganising other 
departments began in 1984. The blueprint for modernizing all government 
departments, 'Managing Change in the Public Sector', was published in 
1986. And most of the 1985-6 editions of The Western Teacher and The W.A. 
Education News contained accounts of plans to introduce the new directions 
for schools announced in the Better Schools Report. 
Yet, when the Better Schools Report was released, many people in the 
education system felt ambushed and violated. They accused the management 
of hatching the Report in secrecy, failing to consult with the rank and 
file, and deliberately releasing the Report while teachers were away on 
Christmas holidays. One event in particular caused deep dismay and 
outrage. Immediately prior to the release of the report, some 75 
superintendents were addressed at a meeting in Central Office, told that 
their permanency had been revoked, and informed that at the end of the 
year they would have to apply in open competition for jobs in the new 
structure. The move was widely condemned as an entirely inappropriate way 
to treat officers who had served the Department loyally for many years. 
Rumours that subject seniors in high schools and principals might meet 
with a similar fate added to the anger. Furthermore, school staff were 
incensed by what they saw as the politicisation and corporatisation of 
their system, the hypocrisy of introducing bottom up reforms by top down 
edicts, and the imposition of new duties without the provision of adequate 
resources. In short, the manner in which the radical restructuring took 
60 
place in 1987 seriously injured relations between the schools and Central 
Off\ce. 
During 1988 and '89, this division between the two tiers hijacked the 
role of the superintendents. Instead of focussing on quality control, 
they became agents of damage control. A:; the front line Ministry officers 
in the field they served as punching bags, absorbing the anger of people 
who hit out against the Central Office. Much of their time was spent 
trying to defuse discontent, present schools with the human face of the 
Ministry, and repair the cracks in trust. The superintendents also 
functioned as apologists for the system. They had to. The rationale for 
radical change presented in the Better Schools Report was limited to a one 
page set of bald assertions. Not surprisingly, when superintendents 
decribe their work they make comments such as: 
"The district superintendent's role is one of team building 
and damage control of morale at all levels." 
"The superintendent's major role is to fix the bridges that 
have been destroyed. We have to explain to the principals 
why the Ministry has made changes and convince them that it 
is good. It's hard." 
"Lately we've been told by our directors of operations that 
we have to show teachers the Ministry does care. But 
superintendents can't really do this, the Ministry has to 
do it. 
"If superintendents become just auditors, who will assure 
teachers. that the Ministry cares?" 
"All the explanations since 1987 have been about what was 
going to happen, not why it was going to happen. There was 
no attempt to win the hearts." 
"An early lesson for me was that I was expected to explain 
and support Central Office policies and plans when I had no 
input to these and very little understanding of them and no 
professional development to do the work. I waited, 
searched for more information, contacted more people. I 
think the principals in the district felt disadvantaged 
because they were not up-to-date as quickly as others." 
"There is no reality to auditing; it's a dreamworld. We 
have to be totally capable of living with ambivalence. 
Central Office just doesn't know. The principals and 
teachers hatred of Central Office is real and interesting." 
/ ( 
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"I'm aware of the gap between me and the schools. There is 
buyers' resistance to change out there." 
"Many of the new 29 metro superintendents have paid the top 
price for the System's inept implementation of massive 
changes. In schools, 'Better Schools' is associated with 
'blood on the toga' and the career ambitions of 
non-educationists in Central Office." 
What made this reconciliatory role heavy work for some superintendents 
was that they themselves had serious reservations about the way the 
reforms took place. The reservations do not end there. They extend to 
some current Central Office practices and standpoints. 
"Philosophically I'm in favour of direction. I don't think 
any major, long term strategic grand plan has been set up 
by the Ministry. It is just groping its way forward. The 
Ministry spouts forward planning as the preferred practice, 
but it Just hasn't been happening. There is a gap between 
rhetoric and reality. It's 'do as I say, not do as I do' 
which decreases the effectiveness of the change. The 
Ministry is not practising what it preaches. It's still a 
top down process. Better Schools is in its fourth year now 
and there is nothing radically new." 
"I have to be honest with principals. If I protect the 
Central Office against poor methodology then I lose an 
investmment. For example, the release of news of the new 
Chief Executive Officer. We could have been told about it 
at the senior officers' meeting. Instead we read about it 
in the press the next morning. If we protect the Ministry 
then a 'them and us' attitude will develop and principals 
will lose confidence." 
"My view is more cautious. I get less excited because I've 
seen the politics and the Ministry's rhetoric. I'm not 
cynical, just a hardened veteran. I've been through lots 
of changes. I realise how difficult changing a 
bureaucratic organisation is. The future of the Ministry 
is no where as likely to happen as readily as some people 
might suggest. When people say, 'This is the grand plan, 
this is the vision' I temper that - we'll never reach it. 
"My experience in curriculum change scenarios is that 
change requires a change in the way people perceive 
things. Unless you get to people's hearts and minds and 
start explaining how they win from participating in a new 
system, unless that is done first, then any change is 
shallow and short lived. 
"Superintendents are locked into a role which is a 
reflection of poor change implementation by Central 
Office. The resources were not looked at nor were the 
industrial expectations." 
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"2000 years of experience walked out the door three years 
ago." 
"The perceived sacking of loyal and competent 
superintendents is part of the organizational folklore. 
This scepticism is also on the current superintendents' 
informal discussion agendas. This weakens the 
organisation." 
"The Ministry is trying to effect changes in the processes 
and structures before changing values and attitudes and 
personal perceptions. They haven't been addressed because 
of naiveity and political expediencies. There have been a 
lot of junior people involved in the change planning. 
"The Executive never workshopped the Better Schools Report 
with us. The senior officers need a residential two day 
course on the philosophy behind it to develop greater 
commitment. n 
"The idea of the Better Schools Report was to de-resource 
Central Office. But in practice Central Office hasn't been 
streamlined. There is still centralist thinking and 
influence on professional development, the school 
development operation, and industrial areas - the Human 
Resources Directorate are preventing changes occurring." 
With the passing of time, it is possible that the wounds will heal and 
changes in the organisation's culture will catch up to the structural 
reform. When that stage is reached, the superintendents will no longer be 
required to play the role of shock absorber, punching bag, system 
apologist, corporate missionary, damage controller, and agent of deep 
coping. 
Industrial Basis or Division 
One source of division between the two tiers that is unlikely to 
, disappear with the passing of time is the conflict of interests that 
traditionally exists between management and labour. Central Office 
executives, directors, and managers are judged by the Ministry's level of 
productivity in relation to the level of resources available. That 
applies particularly in times of economic rationalism when added 
I /' 
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importance is attached to efficiency and effectiveness, and when new needs 
have to be met not by increasing resources but by redistributing existing 
ones. For school staff, resource restructuring should mean different 
work, not extra work. Different work, however, is often seen by staff as 
constituting a threat to their interests, particularly if it involves 
retraining and the risk of failure - without any compensatory rewards. 
For much of the time, the inherent conflict of industrial interests 
between the two tiers lies dormant. Last year { 1989) in Western Australia 
it erupted into a statewide dispute. On a smaller scale, industrial 
unrest can occur within an individual school over matters such as 
replacing asbestos roofs. Moreover, conflict does not always directly 
involve teaching staff - disputes can arise between Central Office and 
groups such as school cleaners. 
Generally, the superintendents are not required to play a conciliatory 
role during disputes between Central Office and schools. So far they have 
been largely, though not entirely, side-lined by both groups. To some 
extent it has been recognised that any involvement by them would 
compromise their credentials to provide principals with collegial support 
upon settlement of the conflict.1 On the other· hand, superintendents do 
experience discomfort during disputes. In some cases, they are unsure of 
their role. In other -cases they find themselves the meat in the sandwich. 
"I investigated some Ministry phone calls about principals 
during industrial unrest and I had to tell some principals 
they'd got it wrong. But I didn't influence or victimize 
anyone. I didn't push the party line. I allowed a 
conscience vote. 11 
111 sat in the staffroom (of a school) during a union 
meeting. I was invited to stay as an observer. Some 
superintendents would not have received that invitation. 11 
Responses 
1 11 A bit weak. It's more because we have no power in decisions on 
these matters (settling disputes) and everyone knows that. 11 
64 
"The schools and Union said, 'We are not part of the 
Ministry.' The directors of operations and Central Office 
said, 'We are part of the Ministry.' The superintendents 
had to tread a delicate line - gently. They made it clear 
where they stood but left the principals alone. And most 
principals didn't go out of their way to make it into a 
confrontation with the superintendents. So after it was 
over, it was easier for superintendents and principals to 
come together because neither made the other side difficult 
during the dispute." 
"The principals wanted to know, 'Are you on our side or the 
Ministry's side'?" 
" 'Whose side are you on?' That came out in the strike a 
lot. We were the meat in the sandwich. Central Office 
expected corporate loyalty from us and said, 'You are the 
employer's representative in the field and you will send in 
notes of who doesn't attend meetings'." 
"In 1989, teachers united with principals against the 
common enemy. This year they are challenging principals." 
"The cleaners dispute was a crisis time. No direction 
comes from Central Office about what role superintendents 
play in these times. Should superintendents visit schools 
and give moral support? Do I have a role talking to 
teachers about the cleaners strike? The directors of 
operations should give superintendents advice on these 
things. I didn't want Central Office endorsement. I Just 
wanted helpful advice. I had to rely on gut level 
intuition. We're constantly thinking on our feet in this 
job and negotiating our role because there is no history to 
it." 
Ideological Basis of Division 
To the extent that a centralized, authoritarian, paternalistic system 
of educational administration produces dependence and conformity, there is 
little tension between the centre and the schools. To the extent that a 
corporate management structure is based on a recentralization/ 
decentralization dualism, it contains the ingredients for continual 
conflict between the two tiers. 
Ideologically, the conflict between schools and the Central Office can 
be conceptualised in several forms. It can be seen as the outcome of 
attempts to strike a balance between general dichotomies such as: freedom 
', .~/ 
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versus authority, independence versus conformity, and needs of the 
individual versus needs of the state. It can spring from the two tiers 
having different opinions on the composition of the common core of values, 
goals and priorities that Central Office sets for schools. It can take 
the form of schools disagreeing with Central Office over what counts as 
being inconsistent with Ministry policy and regulations. It can result 
from some schools interpreting self-determination as complete autonomy and 
resenting any interference from outsiders - particularly Central Office. 
According to superintendents, 
"Fifty percent of the principals say, 'Disband the district 
office and give us the money.' They don't want anyone 
challenging them. They are authoritarian." 
"Some principals want to be totally autonomous. They don't 
even want the Ministry." 
"Schools are not autonomous and never can be. The 
Executive overstated the case. It gave the wrong 
impression to schools. Schools are only self-determining 
in how they will go about things but even then within 
constraints like industrial agreements - and rulings on 
things like school uniforms and teaching English." 
In relation to this constant struggle, superintendents are agents of 
the centre, not the schools. As such they have the task ·or ensuring that 
conflict is resolved in a way that does not compromise the Ministry's 
definition of the situation. At the same time they have a responsibility 
to encourage schools to be self-determining. The result, as one 
superintendent observed, is that: 
"Superintendents have to identify acceptable shades of 
grey. We are moderators and have the authority to say, 
'That is acceptable and that ls unacceptable.' Almost 
weekly, principals challenge our authority to intervene on 
a range of things. And each week I have to counsel a 
principal on the wisdom of his judgement on day to day 
management decisions which in themselves are not major 
educational decisions but which collectively could be 
disastrous if not checked. 
The alternative ls to have detailed regulations, but 
these wouldn't allow for discretion and shades of grey -
the world isn't that simple, it's not black and white. The 
grey nature of human relationships means that boundaries 
are always shifting on personal and local issues. We need 
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to make judgements relative to cases. We need to identify 
the range of tolerance. If a principal steps outside the 
range of tolerance and there is an adverse reaction, the 
superintendent has to make a decision. The 
superintendent's role is concerned with monitoring and 
testing the shades of grey." 
Closing Comment 
The work of superintendents would be easier if the divisions referred 
to in this chapter did not exist. And that would be the case if most 
people in Central Office had their wish. They take a consensus view of 
the state education system. They believe there is no inherent conflict of 
interest between the two tiers or between groups within each tier. They 
say to schools, "We are all the Ministry, the Ministry is all of us, there 
is no Them and Us. "2 However, those are statements of a preferred 
position rather than statements of social reality. The fact is that many 
people, in schools believe the Ministry ls Central Office.3 They believe 
that institutionalised differences in power, rewards, and opportunities 
within the system make some members feel less valued than others. In 
their view as long as these differences exist, individuals and groups will 
be divided not only by unequal conditions but also by unequal loyalty and 
commitment. Or, as several superintendents said: 
"The issue of c-orporate identity and the 'them and us' 
mentality will remain a problem until people in Central 
Office realise that they work in the Central Office of the 
Education Ministry and not in the Education Ministry." 
R88PoD888 
2 "The Ministry consists of three parts - Central Office, district 
offices, and schools. I believe that schools are the most 
important part of the Ministry, certainly not Central Office or 
district offices." 
a "So do people in Central Office." 
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"The politics of a bureaucracy the size of ours involves 
'knowledge as power' still. This keeps alive: the belief 
that things still run top down because all the knowledge is 
in Central Office; field personnel feeling subservient to 
and dependent on Central Office; and the conviction that 
little in the field is important or relevant to the 
direction setting and policy creation of the system. Maybe 
this is a set of perceptions felt more keenly · by country . 
personnel." 
One response to these divisions would be to to allow schools to opt out 
of the system and sever links with Central Office so that the two tiers 
would not be forced into conflict with each other. Another approach is to 
accept constant tension between the two tiers as an inevitable fact of 
life and temper expectations about removing it accordingly; and, as one 
superintendent said, "use the conflict as a means of producing alternative 
possible solutions." 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE SUPERINTENDENT'S POWER IN RELATION TO PRINCIPALS 
"In fact, superintendents are the prime agents of change. 
If I hadn't pushed and said, 'I'm coming back to check,' 
then there would have been no change. Eighty percent of 
change comes from the superintendents and the district 
office, not the principals." 
"A significant number of principals have some intent on 
changing but they'll acquiesce rather than value change 
scenarios. They don't value the direction of the change or 
they have reservations about it to not actively foster it." 
"Some principals buck the system and knock the employer. 
They have no corporate loyalty and have negative opinions 
of their employer. They see us as pro employer." 
"In the (. ..... .) district there is a distillation. We 
have very experienced principals. Some are resistant to 
change. My challenge is to convince them of the value of 
the new system. Some of those who are very critical have 
nothing to lose because they are over 60 years old. But I 
can't wait for two years for them to retire because a 
similar aged person might replace them, so we have to 
change the mechanisms in the school." 
"Many principals who applied for district superintendent 
positions and failed were suspicious of the new breed and 
determined not to accept line management and their 
authority in it." 
Superintendents are agents of change and control. Without their work 
with principals it ls questionable whether the reforms outlined in the 
Better Schools Report would ever be achieved. 1 Once those reforms have 
Responses 
1 "In my district 80% of change comes from the young upward mobile 
principals." 
I /' 
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been put in place, the superintendent's role as change agent will become 
more one of system maintenance - unless a further radical restructuring is 
introduced. The control role is endless. It involves protecting hard won 
gains and ensuring quality control - that is, assuring the highest levels 
of performance, whatever stage of organisational development the system is 
at. 
According to Stoner, Collins, and Yetton, quality control entails four 
steps: establishing standards and methods for measuring performance; 
measuring the performance; determining whether performance matches 
standards; and taking corrective action if performance falls short of 
standards - by either changing the activities or changing the standards. 
The last step is important because unless superintendents see the control 
process through to its conclusion, "they are merely monitoring performance 
rather than exercising control. The emphasis should always be on devising 
constructive ways to bring performance up to standard, rather than merely 
identifying past failures" (1985:728). The superintendent's job is not to 
personally carry out those four steps in each school. Rather, it is to 
ensure that each school carries them out effectively for itself. 
Responses to organisational change 
The amount of power superintendents need to function effectively as 
agents of change and control depends on how much resistance they face from 
principals. That, in turn, depends on how principals react to the new 
responsibilities which a system of self-determining schools places upon 
them. Conceivably, their responses could range from complete rejection to 
complete acceptance. In fact, using those extremes as end points of a 
continuum, at least four ideal types of principals can be identified, 
namely: active opponents, passive dissenters, pragmatists, and system 
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supporters. "Briefly and broadly, the characteristics of each ideal 
type2 can be outlined as follows. 
Active opponents attack the new system by criticising and complaining 
about it in whatever forums are available to them "'."" staffrooms, 
principals' associations, political parties, community organisations, 
informal networks, the mass media, and professional journals. Their 
approach entails obstructing the implementation of the reforms, 
undermining public confidence in the new order, and mobilizing support for 
a return to the old system. 
Passive dissenters are also comprehensively opposed to the extra duties 
assigned to principals, but they are not prepared to engage in either open 
or guerilla warfare against the changed order. Instead, they withdraw to 
the sidelines and, wherever possible, pursue a policy of non-involvement. 
Their resistance, then, takes the form of refusing to publicly endorse the 
reforms, taking no initiative to make the new process work, and having to 
be led or carried every step along the road to 'self-determination'. With 
them, it is a case of devaluing organisational change by treating it with 
studied indifference. 
Pragmatists share some of the active opponent and passive dissenters' 
reservations about the new responsibilities assigned to principals; at 
the same time they accept that some change is inevitable and desirable. 
Therefore they are prepared to cooperate with the management provided they 
are given scope to be role-makers rather than simply role-takers. This 
means the negotiation of concessions about the number of extra duties to 
be carried out and the style in which they are performed. 
2 Ideal types are abstractions from reality that are based on 
observations of concrete instances but are "not designed to 
correspond exactly to any single empirical observation (Theodorson, 
G.A. and A.G. ( 1969), A Modern Dictionary of Sociology, Barnes and 
NoJ>le, New York, p.193.) 
/' 
/' 
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System supporters are committed to making a success of self-
determining schools. They do everything the management asks of them 
wlllingly, wholeheartedly and enterprisingly. They defend the new sytem 
against attack, 'talk up' its strengths in appropriate forums, and 
generally convey optimism about the future outcomes of the changes. 
Only four ideal types have been outlined above; there are others.3 
Also, in reality there are variations within any one type. For example, 
some passive dissenters may occupy a point on the continuum close to that 
of the active opponents, while others may be more appropriately placed 
near the pragmatists. 4 
Reasons for different responses 
Why do principals react differently to the same set of extra 
responsibilities? Two factors account for a lot of the variation; self 
interest and ideology. 
A common reaction to organisational change by principals, and indeed 
any one else affected, is to ask, "What's in it for me? Do I stand to 
gain or lose?" Principals opposed to self-determining schools are likely 
to be those who lack faith in their ability to handle the extra 
responsibilities involved. For them, the new order represents a threat to 
job security. Job success, and Job satisfaction; they see it as reducing 
Re8POlll81 
3 "I think this section on Responses to Organisational Change is a 
bit glib ........ sorry. It seems too superficial and too 
selective because it is a huge topic which could warrant another 
paper." 
4 "Others change their position almost on a dally basis. Others are 
not even on the scale" (a reference group member). 
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their prospects of promotion and as being simply more work, more worry, 
and a waste of their time and effort. System supporters, on the other 
hand, are likely to be principals who believe that their interests will be 
enhanced by the reforms. From their viewpoint, self-determining schools 
offer increased opportunities for career advancement, professional 
autonomy, and personal achievement. Moreover, system supporters are 
inclined to have confidence in their ability to capitalize on those 
opportunities. 
Another type of question that a principal is likely to ask about 
radical change is this: "Will self-determining schools do more good than 
harm to the education of pupils and to the well-being of the community?" 
The answers to this question will vary because principals have different 
sets of beliefs, or ideologies, about what constitutes a good education 
system. Clearly, principals who answer the question in the affirmative 
will be inclined to provide system support. A negative answer, on the 
other hand, will point principals in the direction of active opposition" 
(Chadbourne 1989:64-55). 
Superintendents' Power 
When combatting resistance to change and development, superintendents 
can employ two types of power: force and legitimacy. Force involves 
pulling rank (formal authority) backed up by the threat or application of 
sanctions.!! It can have some effect on self interest, but not on 
--------------------------------------------------------
Responses 
!I "Sanctions were talked about a lot in '87 but have not been 
discussed or mentioned of late. There are no sanctions other than 
under the regs (old system!)." 
"I don't use this at all. I haven't needed to. I'm told it's 
·'I 
9lfferent in the city." 
/' 
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ideology. That is, in the face of force, principals are likely to see 
that it ls in their interests to comply with what the superintendent 
wants. It is far less certain that they can be forced to change their 
ideology. When it comes to winning hearts and minds, legitimacy is 
required. 
Poree 
The superintendents gave varied accounts of how much formal authority 
they have. For instance, some said they did have authority to direct 
principals, whereas others said they could only make suggestions or 
recommendations. 
"Industrial disputes have held up most issues like school 
development plans. Hence we can't direct yet." 
"If schools are not complying with Ministry policy, the 
action is very clear." 
"District superintendents have considerable authority. 
This is vested in the audit and policy function." 
"If the school development plan guidelines are not complied 
with, the superintendents can direct principals to do it. 
Some superintendents have wanted to intervene but are not 
sure whether the system would support them, or they ring up 
the director of operations to double check because there is 
no clear policy." 
"Superintendents can direct principals - it's in the 
regulations." 
"The power of superintendents? Very little. We can't 
direct. We do the groundwork and the director of 
operations then directs the principals. I provide 
counselling but the principal can choose to ignore my 
suggestions. I could ask the director of operations to 
direct but it would take a long time before anything was 
achieved. The superintendents superintend and the 
directors direct." 
"A major reason for tension between principals and district 
superintendents is that some superintendents have attempted 
to operate very much in an audit role almost from the 
outset. Some claim to move from school to school 'auditing 
and approving school development plans.' And this was done 
well before the emergence of the policy statement 
concerning school development plans and obviously well 
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before the Memorandum. No .wonder relationships have been a 
bit ordinary. Some of the directors of operations may ·need 
to wear some of this difficulty too. They may well have 
been instructing superintendents to operate in this way." 
Several steps can be taken to add to the authority of superintendents. 
One is to publish a clear statement of the directive powers that they do 
have. Another is to publish a more comprehensive set of policies that can 
be referred to when their counsel is questioned by principals. More 
broadly: 
"The power of the superintendents depends on four 
conditions being present: interpersonal skills such as 
negotiation, conflict resolution, problem solving; a 
framework of policies so the system knows what is expected 
of it; line management relationships defined and practised 
as defined; and superintendents need authority. "6 (How 
many of those are in place?] "Professional development for 
superintendents is not fully in place; in fact principals 
get more professional development than superintendents. 
The policies are coming very slowly, two or three years 
after they're needed. Line management - that is frequently 
forgotten by the Ministry in terms of some major strategies 
9entral Office is planning; for example, professional 
development programmes and communication - the Executive 
meets more frequently with principals' associations than 
with the superintendents. Authority is provided when the 
first three empower the superintendents." 
Theoretically, if principals refuse to comply with legitimate requests, 
then superintendents can apply a number of sanctions. For example, a 
superintendent could: send an adverse report on a principal to Central 
Office; make a negative recommendation in relation to promotion; refuse 
to approve the school development plan; deny resources, services, 
facilities, and equipment; reject invitations to attend school 
functions; withhold support if trouble arises with parents, staff, 
students, and the local community; and refuse to endorse applications for 
--------------------------------------------------------
Responses 
& "Many superintendents have the first three - but this ls often 
neg~ted by the fourth which is very powerful." 
:.'/ 
I /' 
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special leave, projects, funds, jobs outside the system, and transfers 
within the system. With the exception of merit promotion reports, such 
sanctions are rarely applied.7 And even with promotions, 
superintendents feel they have lost some power. For example:. 
"In the old days I'd write a little screed on principals 
seeking merit promotion. Then all the names would be put 
on the board and the superintendents would gather around 
and sort out the pecking order. 8 The superintendents 
had power then. They've lost that now. Now it's done 
independent of superintendents who write a big screed on 
applicants." 
"We haven't got the dollar we used to have. We can't enter 
into staffing arrangements. In the old days my opinion on 
promotion was sought and all transfers came across my 
desk. Now it is more clinical. The schools go straight 
through to Central Office. "9 
"The superintendent has no decision making power except 
executive support from the district office staff. The only 
bit of power left is the power to distribute support." 
"We have no financial clout. The Executive got rid of 
superintendents' discretionary funds. There are more 
committees formed to distribute resources like minor 
works. The special promotion system used to give 
superintendents more clout." 
"We can't withold resources because that would punish the 
school, it would hurt the school community. It's what I 
call biting your bum." 
"Any principal wanting promotion is civilised and less 
antagonistic towards Central Office." 
"We only have clout with principals seeking promotion." 
Responses 
1 "Are you sure? I believe that quite often minor works 
applications, requests for support on funding matters, etc., are 
decided on the basis of a 'disagreement with the superintendent', 
though legitimate excuses are always found to substantiate refusal" 
(a reference group member). 
e "This system was not always fair and it was an exclusive club, 
making career decisions." 
9 "Is the superintendency about power or something more important -
educating kids?" 
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"Using adverse reports is heavy stuff. And a case could go 
on for two years because the battle lines would be drawn." 
"We could write an adverse report, but as an absolute last 
resort because of the human element. We always hope 
something else will work." 
"You can use the director of operations but that is similar 
to adverse reports - the principal can run to the union." 
"A lot of principals get away with murder because we can't 
take a hard line because of a lot of changes. It was 
easier under the old centralized system to get short term 
success and employ sanctions." 
On the positive side, and in addition to recommending promotion, the 
superintendents referred to two forms of rewards at their disposal:10 
"You've got the gen, the good oil. You're the bearer of 
good or bad tidings. You have privileged information. 
Principals love the gossip. They will keep on the right 
side to get the good oil. "11 
"Each superintendent is given a budget to offer principals 
private and confidential personal development. That 
increases the power and credibility of superintendents." 
Several measures could be taken to increase the range of sanctions 
available to superintendents and reduce their reluctance to apply them. 
One is to place all principals on fiv.e year contracts and make them 
renewable subject to a positive recommendation from the superintendent. 
At present, for all practical purposes, principals not applying for 
promotion are untouchable. Another measure is to limit the 
Responses 
10 "This is the salvation of the role. If only we could negotiate 
rewards with principals based on performance management criteria 
we would have all the 'power' we need. A holiday in Fiji? Why 
not? A conference in Thailand? Why not? But only for the 
achievers, as judged by the district superintendents." 
11 "Principals often know before superintendents do." 
"Generally, principals have more 'gossip' than us through a very 
effective network." 
_:., 
· r 
/ /' 
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superintendents' role to that of auditing schools and principals.12 As 
long· as superintendents feel required to provide principals with support, 
they will be reluctant to impose sanctions. The underlying concern is that 
punitive action might adversely affect the type of collegiality necessary 
for effective professional counselling. A third measure is to form a 
superintendents institute to combat the moral and political force of the 
principals associations. 13 Superintendents would be more confident about 
applying sanctions if they knew they had the collective support of their 
colleagues. 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is the alternative to force. Superintendents possess 
legitimacy when they have authority in the eyes of the principals, when 
they are granted the right by principals to act as supervisors. In terms 
of superintendent/principal relations, the system can bestow authority on 
superintendents but not legitimacy - only principals can do that. 
Superintendents who have been granted legitimacy are in a position to 
gain the cooperation of principals through persuasion and respect rather 
than by pulling rank or employing sanctions. Legitimacy enables 
superintendent111 to get a fair hearing from principals - it permits reason 
to prevail. In extreme cases, though, legitimacy may allow unquestioning 
acceptance of what the superintendent says, out of deference for either the 
person or the position. 
Reapoaaea 
12 "Where would the trust be then? Them and Us would be entrenched." 
13 "This idea of principals associations being a threat doesn't hold." 
"This support base needs to be established." 
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Expertise is one basis of legitimacy. Actually having expertise is not 
sufficient. Principals must perceive that superintendents possess it. In 
most cases real ability shines through. However, the superintendents feel 
that principals' perceptions of them are sometimes based on stereotypes. 
In some instances lack of formal qualifications, no school administrator 
experience, and being female were seen as barriers to legitimacy. 
"Superintendents with no paper qualifications have to earn 
respect." 
"Principals see superintendents as a reward for serving the 
Ministry well. They think all superintendents should be 
appointed from the ranks of principals." 
"One has to win one's spurs and to demonstrate one can do 
the task we ask of principals. When a superintendent has 
little school or principal experience then naturally their 
ability to question what a principal does will come under 
scrutiny." 
"Some superintendents have never been principals. 
Principals feel those superintendents don't know what they 
are doing." 
"I fear I intruded on the mateship of primary principals, 
their male bonding. If any of my principals go to my 
director of operations with a management complaint I told 
him I want to be present." 
"Sexism? We are gradually overcoming that. Women 
superintendents were regarded as 'boundary riders' 
appointed only to work out in the sticks. "14 
"The principals are improving. Some used to be rude. They 
did not give me much leeway to sort out my role or give me 
open invitations to address staff. It's hard for me to 
work out if this is because of their antagonism toward 
Central Office or because of stereotyped thinking about 
females in authority." 
--------------------------------------------------------
Responses 
14 "Legitimacy comes from doing the job. The red herring of sexism 
should not be allowed to enter the debate." 
I /' 
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Another factor affecting principals' perceptions of superintendents' 
expertise is networking. Evidently, it can boost or block an individual's 
legitimacy. 
"One strategy to gain legitimacy is· networking; the word 
gets around." 
"Having different groups causes problems because districts 
get compared. Principals play one superintendent off 
against another. They phone each other up. "111 
Some superintendents considered that their credibility in schools 
suffers because the position of superintendent has very little standing in 
the eyes of certain principals. One factor seen to be responsible here, 
is antipathy towards anything associated with the new system. Another 
is, a view among some principals that if district offices were disbanded 
it would take· months for schools to notice. A third factor is the high 
turnover rate in district offices, often as a result of superintendents 
being seconded or taking leave: for example, "I'm the fourth 
superintendent in four years at the ( ..... ) district." Furthermore: 
"An added factor is the high turnover of principals in 
country schools. It takes time to establish the bond between 
district superintendent/principal roles. 
"We have no clear direction from Central Office about how to 
do merit promotion. I try to fit the normal curve but some 
other superintendents are too generous. The system is 
amateurish and that decreases our standing." 
"As superintendents we face stress because of unclear 
directions, inconsistency from Central Office, lack of 
strategic planning skills at Central Office, and the 
historical bloodbath of the Functional Review Committee - the 
sacking of the superintendents showed a profound lack of 
understanding." 
"Until the industrial agreement, the school development 
guidelines have no offical sanction by the teaching 
fraternity." 
--------------------------------------------------------
Reapoases 
111 "This is also a Central Office/district problem." 
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Up till now, the legitimacy of some superintendents apparently has 
depended as much on personal qualities as on professional expertise. That 
situation can leave them feeling vulnerable and at the mercy of the 
principals' goodwill. 
"How much I can influence depends on my personal 
resources." 
"Some superintendents maintain power by 'bonhomie'. They 
establish a personal relationship with principals. Other 
superintendents are hardliners, thick skinned, bombastic, 
and give orders. Most superintendents however actively try 
to get power through their endeavours, earning respect via 
an ability to lead." 
"We achieve a lot from goodwill generated from personal 
relationships." 
"I've had no problems with principals because I waited till 
I got a good proflle. After three years in the district 
I'm running performance management for the first time." 
"The two fundamentals to a good relationship between 
superintendents and principals are the school development 
plan and an appropriate supervision or performance 
management programme. Until these are in place the 
'relationship relies on goodwill and personalities. How do 
you give good non-threatening feedback in a situation where 
there are no rules." 
"Although most principals are individually courteous and 
professional, the System reached an all-time low in some 
displays of emotive rudeness at principals' and deputies' 
conferences over the last two years. At the district level 
too, a negative and pugnacious minority of principals can 
dictate the quality of debate and cooperation. I even had 
to phone one of my principals to confirm whether he had 
been insulting to my secretary. He carefully explained he 
meant the insult for my education officer. I asked him to 
desist from insults. He did not apologise. A few weeks 
later, another district office staff member expressed 
surprise at how pleasant this principal had been to her. I 
suspect this was not my discussion with him, but a little 
resourcing power which the Central Office had dropped into 
supers' laps that contributed to this change of attitude." 
Closing comment 
The material presented in this chapter suggests the amount of power 
that superintendents have is determined by three factors: their own 
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personal qualities and professional expertise; the regulations, policies, 
and political will of the system; and the power of school principals. It 
also raises a range of questions such as: How much power do 
superintendents need? If superintendents are the agents of 
accountability, do they have enough power to carry out that role 
effectively? ls the amount of power superintendents have determined by 
their role or is their role determined by how much power they have? Can 
superintendents increase their power only at the expense of rrlncipals 
losing some of theirs? 
As has been the case throughout much of this chapter, the closing words 
on these issues will be left to the superintendents. There are two broad 
perspectives. One perspective is represented by comments which indicate 
that superintendents feel they do not have enough authority, force, or 
legitimacy. 
"I tried to bring about a change in the management style of 
a principal but in the end there was nothing I could do 
about it." 
"One old principal in my district has hated the Ministry 
for 35 years. He has alienated the school community, has 
no school development plans, and always wants me to solve 
his problems. All I can do is stimulate him and keep his 
interest" 
"A key issue in our organisation ls that a manager at 
superintendent level must have prescribed power and status 
and a role which is educationally significant - one that 
enables us to make a difference. We should be doing more 
than swanning around using infiuence and being supporters 
and facilitators. Just relying on influence is wimpish." 
"I lack power in the secondary school situation because 
there are no structures in place to do my job. Where does 
the power come from?" 
"I find audit threatening because if I find faults I have 
to do something about it. Some superintendents lost power 
and can no longer structure principals to do what 
superintendents want them to and if they find fault then 
they have no power to change it and therefore the 
superintendent gets a black mark." 
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The other perspective is represented by comments which indicate that 
superintendents feel they do have enough power in relation to principals. 
/ /' 
"One principal ruled that all pupils must wear uniforms 
because he picked up from the shopping centre gossip that 
uniforms set the tone. I got 20 calls a day from parents 
complaining about it and discussed the matter with him. He 
said, "Don't you trust me?" I said, "Yes, but it's not in 
the regulations." I knew what his strategy was and he knew 
my situation with the regulations. So we agreed to get 
extra money to buy extra uniforms for children without 
them. It took a while but we worked out an effective 
strategy which lead to a good relationship. Some 
principals expect superintendents to close ranks against 
parents who complain." 
"Fundamentally I don't want district superintendents to be 
directional in a school, like some other superintendents 
do. They want power for what? To influence the principal 
to do what?" 
"My philosophy has changed. Previously I'd say, 'That's no 
good. Fix it.' Now I take more time and keep wearing 
away. I use all the subtleties, not overt power.'' 
"Why should principals do what superintendents want them to 
do? Isn't the scheme for schools to be self-determining 
within Ministry guidelines?" 
"Performance management is a legitimacy factor. I think 
the principals perceive it as important and very 
professional, relevant and fulfilling a need, and bringing 
monitoring into the arena in a positive way and linking the 
two tiers of the service in a trusting and collegial spirit 
- we hope." 
"We have influence, not power, and that makes schools more 
self-determining. The leadership role for the 
superintendent is to secure commitment, not compliance from 
principals." 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
According to Stoner, Collins, and Yetton, management consists of four 
processes: planning, organising, leading, and controlling. A recurring 
theme throughout this report has been that in the management of the state 
education system, the district superintendents' primary role is -
control. In the final analysis, schools and the system do not need 
superintendents for planning, organising, and leading. They can do those 
things for themselves. This is not to say that superintendents cannot 
offer leadership. Clearly they can, but within a system of 
self-determining schools it is a more limited type of leadership than was 
the case with superintendents before 1987. As one district superintendent 
said: 
"The superintendents are only leaders in the sense of being 
a skilled courtroom lawyer. We have room for transactional 
leadership because we shape principals' interpretations of 
Ministry policy. There isn't much room for 
transformational leadership. "1 
It is the superinte-ndents' job to pursue the control process through to 
its conclusion by taking corrective action if schools go down the wrong 
track or do not go far enough down the right track. They should not have 
to negotiate with schools to perform that function. Principals can 
Responses 
1 "But we can do this (transformational leadership) and have to 
consciously work on it." 
84 
rightfully refuse to accept assistance from superintendents when 
developing and implemementing their school plans, but they can not refuse 
to have those plans audited. What they can legitimately expect is that 
the monitoring be conducted fairly and constructively and that they are 
not held responsible for factors outside their school's control. To meet 
those expectations, superintendents need time to collect sufficient· 
information to validate claims about each school's performance. They also 
need time to establish non-threatening relationships with key members of 
school communities. In practical terms that probably means being 
responsible for no more than fifteen schools - in other words, doubling 
the size of the superintendency. 
Some educational futurologists may question whether self-determining 
schools will need superintendents in the long term, even for control. 
Their vision includes a further radical restructuring in which the two 
tier system is reduced to one tier, namely, publicly funded independent 
schools. The use of educational vouchers and 'opting out' along 
Thatcherian lines provide mechanisms for pursuing that scenario. Several 
superintendents made comments intimating that for them the prospect of a 
one tier system is not beyond the realms of possibility. 
"District offices exist to help schools become 
self-determining. Eventually we should become 
redundant. "2 
"Ultimately there ls no need for middle management. 
Central Office could give a license to schools on the right 
track." 
--------------------------------------------------------
Responses 
2 "Having no district office doesn't mean a one tier system. 
/ /' 
We still would have Central Office and schools" (a reference 
group member). 
"There is a need . to differentiate between district office and 
superintendent." 
85 
"Provided we produce quality principals and good curriculum 
leadership sense, then I don't think we need any greater 
assurances about student outcomes." 
"We should train principals so they do their own 
self-evaluation, their own school evaluation." 
"If I do my job properly, I won't be needed in five years 
time." 
"I question whether we'll need district offices when 
schools develop expertise and can buy expertise from 
providers outside the Ministry." 
Before going too far down the one tier path, it should be remembered 
that in performing a quality control role, superintendents are not just 
agents of excellence, they are also agents of equity. Without effective 
central regulation, some self-determining schools would become co-opted by 
the forces of unbridled self-interest. For example, in the wake of 
deregulation and privatisation, the first step for some school communities 
would be to declare themselves academically selective and cream off the 
high achieving students without any thought or concern for the social 
consequences of their actions. 
It might seem that assigning superintendents predominantly to the area 
of control devalues their role, given the negative stereotypes surrounding 
the notion of 'control'. The reality is quite different. The type of 
control which superintendents exercise is an integral part of a broader 
challenge, namely: to bring into balance the conditions for excellence, 
enterprise and economic growth on the one hand, with the conditions for 
equality of opportunity, participation and social worth on the other. It 
is difficult to think of a role more demanding, or more important. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DISSENTING RESPONSES 
In order to enable members of a wider group to participate in the 
study, Chapters 1-7 were circulated as a draft report to thirty one 
superintendents throughout the state, for comment. Copies were also sent 
to a small informal reference group outside the superintendency (see page 
three). Twenty seven superintendents replied within the four week period 
allocated for this activity. Overall, their responses can be summed up in 
three interrelated ways: none of the general points, themes or claims in 
the draft report was challenged by a majority of superintenents; all the 
general points, themes and claims were supported by most superintendents; 
in broad terms, the superintendents endorsed what was said in the draft 
report. This does not mean they agreed with every comment, or thought the 
report covered all the important issues. As the footnotes in previous 
chapters indicate, different superintendents disagreed with different 
particular statements. This chapter presents other dissenting responses, 
made by a minority of superintendents. 
Chapter One: Introduction 
In introducing the study, Chapter One outlined why the role of district 
superintendents is seen to lack definition and direction. A number of 
respondents considered the account to be either excessive or dated. 
"When superintendents took up their appointment in 1988, 
they knew the changed role in some detail." 
"I always had a fair idea of what my role was and would 
be. As it turned out I read the play - and as our role 
becomes more fonnally stated it coincides with what I 
;,, anticipated." 
/ 
/ 
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"The role is increasingly becoming clarified - for example, 
through the Demonstrating Accountability Project." 
"The role is clearing significantly as a result of events 
during the May-July period." 
"The Agreement provides focus." 
Chapter Two: A Two Tier System 
The central theme of Chapter Two was that the new structure set up in 
1987 should be seen as consisting not of three tiers but of two - a 
unified Central Office and schools. That is, the district offices are not 
a third tier. The district superintendents are part of the unified 
Central Office and the other staff in the district offices belong to the 
schools. Except for several respondents, that notion received widespread, 
though often qualified, support. 
One superintendent found difficulty with the view that the district 
office was only a nominal entity housing representatives from the other 
two tiers. He said: 
"I would agree that regulations, curriculum frameworks and 
staffing decisions are largely, though not completely, Central 
Office responsibility. However, I argue that districts, 
through their boards of management can and must structure 
goals, priorities and policies as an agreed district statement 
to make the best possible use of resources and time in a 
cooperative and consensual way. Unless this occurs through a 
district board of management, what is the purpose of having 
such a board? 
From this rationale, I return to the point I made about 
regulations, curriculum frameworks and staffing decisions not 
being completely a Central Office responsibility. By this, I 
mean that while Central Office can make statements of intent, 
a board of management, representing schools, can respond to 
those statements in such a way as to promote the need for and 
even an alteration of any of the three elements. I guess what 
I'm saying is that policy can be influenced, and this begs the 
question of whether influencing a stated policy bears any 
comparison with developing a policy. I happen to believe that 
it does, while acknowledging that it is a point needing 
careful consideration. For all that, I argue at this point 
that superintendents can and do affect policy, both in its 
formulation and its implementation, through their involvement 
with boards of management charged with developing district 
policy." 
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The perspective outlined by this superintendent is consistent with the 
'nesting' concept underlying the South Australian system. In that state, 
the "activities of the operational (area/regional) directorates are nested 
within the framework provided by the Central Directorates above them. 
Likewise, the operation of schools is nested within the structure provided 
above them by the Area Directorates" (Education Review Unit 1989:8). 
A number of questions arise from these perspectives. Is it any more 
appropriate for superintendents to be members of district management 
boards than school councils (SBDMG's)? Should an individual school's 
adaptation of Ministry policies to the particular circumstances of its own 
community be constrained by the collective interpretation of those polices 
by all the schools in the district? Does 'nesting' re-create the 
blanketing effect which the regional offices under the previous system 
exerted on the schools' progress towards self-determination and Central 
Office's responsiveness to schools? 
A second superintendent saw a need for some connecting unit between 
Central Office and schools because "there is too long a line, particularly 
in the case of remote schools." She said that for a lot of principals who 
are new or not strong, "the district office serves as a collection and 
dissemination point, a security connection." In her view, 
"We won't be ready for a two tier system until schools 
become more self determining, till schools have more power 
- particuarly over their own staffing. Until we go down 
that track a lot further, the two tier system won't work." 
A third superintendent objected to parts of Chapter Two on the grounds 
that, "You can't slap a two tier template across W.A. and expect to make 
it work. It works in the city with secondary schools but not in some 
country schools." He divided superintendents, and models, into purists 
and pragmatists: 
/ /' 
"In the purists' model of Better Schools, the notion of 
self-determination is such that the superintendents have very 
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little power at all and no control over their staff; district 
office staff are controlled by principals. With pragmatists 
it is business as usual. · 
According to the purist model, district offices should not 
have a culture, they should not be an impediment to the flow 
of devolution from Central Office directly to schools. What 
it forgets is that we are running a system of education in one 
of the biggest states in one of the most centralized countries 
in the world. District offices need to develop a culture that 
schools can attach themselves to because of the geographical. 
isolation and the schools' distrust of Central Office. 
Pragmatists know better and have developed a district office 
culture. I'm very tolerant of the impurity of the model. I 
can happily live with the joint role of educational leadership 
and audit and the fusion of district superintendent and 
district office ............ .. 
The models that came out of the Organisation Development 
Unit are too pure for the system. For example, to say that 
the district superintendent should not control district office 
staff may well be possible in the metro area but not in my 
country area. Also, the purist model is based on us having 
100% highly competent principals. We haven't got that." 
Several other responses suggest that some superintendents have mixed 
feelings about the two tier system and might identify themselves as either 
reluctant purists or reluctant pragmatists. 
"The concept of separating the district superintendent from 
the district office creates ambivalence within me. I do 
not worry about this happening as long as I am left with 
the resources to do my job - the supervision of schools." 
"The last section ('A Clarifying Step') is good. But there 
is no need for such a complete split. There is a 
relationship between the district superintendent and the 
district office which is different to that of the district 
superintendent/school relationship. The district 
superintendent needs to be able to closely interact with 
the district office, especially in contributing a district 
'global view', continuity, and leadership." 
"I can identify with the superintendent who said, 'The best 
moments come when I'm with my own district office staff' -
but not for the same reason. If we run as a two tier 
system then being a superintendent is a lonely job - we 
don't have a lot to do with the district office, the 
district superintendent is not part of the team. At 
present we get ongoing interaction working in a team 
instead of being a lonely character on our own. Some of 
the frustrations of the Job and the harsher comments on the 
lack of consultation in this report come from not being 
part of a team and being out on our own. I have a half way 
step to separating the offices. While conceptually there 
are two offices, the district office provides me with 
executive support, so district office staff straddle both 
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tiers. Superintendents in some cases have gone the 
regional mode and created a third tier. I dichotomize the 
district and the district office. The district has a 
superintendent and some resources. It is not synonymous 
with the district office. That's how I try to overcome a 
misconception.' 
Several superintendents emphasized that the three tier system of the 
past only applied to primary schools. Secondary schools, they said, were 
left almost untouched by regional offices and therefore operated basically 
under a two tier system consisting of schools and subject superintendents 
based at Central Office. That two tier system, however, differed markedly 
from the one outlined in this report. In several ways it undermined, 
rather than promoted, the development of self-determining schools. For 
example, it allowed teachers to appeal to a subject superintendent for a 
ruling that conflicted with what a school saw as representing its best 
interests. It also allowed teachers' professional identities and 
loyalties to become bound more to their subject and superintendent than to 
their schools and principal ( Chadbourne and Quin 1990). 
One superintendent was critical of the section headed 'Factors 
Confounding a Two Tier System.' In his view, the basis for confusion lay 
not simply with structural influences, such as: Central Office issuing 
superintendents with a brief to get districts set up; the Better Schools 
Report explicitly outlining three levels - school, district, central; and 
the Ministry physically housing district superintendents and consultants 
under the one roof. An equally important source of confusion was the 
construction that superintendents themselves actively placed on those 
external constraints. Thus, said the superintendent who made this point, 
"I am arguing that the confounding factors were not so much 
caused by the setting up of districts, but by the wishes and 
interpretations of people involved in the role of the 
superintendent of those districts, me included. Very simply, 
the interpretations and alternative realities of people 
involved would have done as much, if not more, to create the 
confusion. Our current attempts to make sense of the present 
in terms of the past must logically look at what was said, but 
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we must also ask the question of how what was said was 
interpreted, and for what reasons, vested or otherwise. 
I don't find the latter point coming through in your work. 
Sure, there are reasons to look 'out' at all the factors 
creating the confusion. But in pointing out those factors, 
and thus shifting responsibility to the facilitators and 
implementers of the change, which up to a point is fair 
enough, .there is also the need to look inwards and ask what 
superintendents themselves did to create the confusion." 
Three people questioned the commonly accepted view that superintendents 
are, or should be, in response mode. A reference group member said that 
contrary to popular thought, 
"Better Schools put the district superintendent in an active 
quality control response mode - but people didn't know enough 
about what that meant." 
On a different tack, one superintendent made this observation regarding 
his colleagues comments on page nine: 
"These four comments imply that power is something that is 
formally derived through money, status, authority. Thus 'we 
are in response mode' must hold true. But doesn't this 
overlook informal aspects of power? Surely 'we' can stlll be 
proactive rather than simply reactive. Maybe these comments 
are saying that now subordinates won't necessarily do what 
subordinates say they should. Is that right? Food for 
thought." 
More descriptively, another superintendent commented: 
"We are in 'response mode' is not entirely true. Some 
district offices were quite proactive." 
Chapter Three: The Centre Tier - Separating Operations From Policy 
Chapter Three examined how the district superintendent's position in 
Central Office has been affected by the separation of operations from 
policy within the Ministry since 1987. Nearly all the superintendents 
agreed with the main findings, which were as follows: the formal 
structure largely excludes superintendents from the development of 
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system-wide policy; some consultation occurs but only at the level of 
tokenism; the limited scope for influencing policy makes superintendents 
supervisors and custodians of change rather than architects and captains 
of change; and a desire exists among superintendents to play a greater 
role in policy development. 
In constrast to the high level of general agreement on those matters, a 
few superintendents raised points of qualification and disputation. One 
superintendent claimed that he and the principals in his district did have 
an opportunity to significantly restructure centrally formulated policy 
that they decided "was not in the best interests of their schools." 
Sometimes this meant slowing down "irrelevant or inadequately thought out 
policy." He also said that whilst superintendents contributed little to 
state-wide policy at the formal level, informally there was considerable 
scope for providing meaningful input. For those reasons, he said, 
"I always saw myself as being able to be involved in and to 
' affect policy formulation ........ To explain, let's start 
from the statement that 'the (.. my .. ) District is 
different.' That is a fact. Whatever policy is set 
centrally, it is always possible to make it look from 
slightly to totally ridiculous relative to the ( ..... ) 
District, and for the whole time I was part of the district, 
we (the principals and I) argued that if policy was to be set 
centrally, it should be done in terms of setting a policy 
that was applicable to the ( ..... ) District. From that 
policy, the 'makers' could then 'work back' to see if that 
policy fitted a city district. We argued that what happened 
constantly was the reverse. An example was the First Steps 
Programme - structured to apply to city districts, and had no 
chance of being cost or resource effective in the ( ..... ) 
District. 
We were saying that rather than set policy and then look at 
its implementation, people should see implementation as the 
umbrella under which policy must always be defined. If that 
is accepted, then the district, in consultation with and 
through its superintendent, must be involved in policy 
formulation. Who knows the district better than the 
superintendent who represents principals who represent the 
school community ........ .. 
I never relaxed from what became a vigil - contacting 
people in Central Office to warn, disagree, argue, promote 
and cajole about what was being planned for education 
relative to the (. .... ) District. I found, most 
interestingly, that people from the Executive Director to the 
Health Education Consultant, listened, thought about what was 
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put to them, and responded. I have to admit that the 
responses were rarely ever exactly what I wanted them to be, 
but I also claim, that most often, the original intentions 
(including mine) were modified. Thinking retrospectively, I 
trod on some toes, made a few enemies, and probably was seen 
at times as pedantic and obstructive. However, certain 
things did alter - not necessarily in the way that policy was 
set, but certainly at times in the way policy was altered, 
and certainly, frequently, the way that policy was to be 
implemented ......... 
This then leads to another statement you make, that of the 
notion of superintendents being supervisors and custodians of 
change which they do not define. I find it to be 
proble.matic. We are only supervisors and custodians if we 
refuse to become involved in what schools and the district 
are about and why. I argue that the role depends on how 
superintendents seek to set, participate in, or influence 
policy, and for what reasons. If it is to satisfy their own 
need to see education functioning as they believe it should, 
then devolution doesn't happen. change only happens according 
to the wishes of the superordinate - communities and 
principals get left out and we return to 'regionalization'. 
If it is to help individual schools or groups of schools 
achieve a policy which suits their needs, then devolution, 
and thus policy making at school and district level, has some 
chance of occurring. 
I saw it as my role to participate in, to influence, and to 
restructure if necessary, central policy formulation and 
implementation where both the principals and I decided it was 
not in the best interests of their schools. In those terms, 
I think I was more than a supervisor and custodian of 
change. In that sense I was a facilitator and a producer of 
change at the local level for reasons which belonged to the 
local level." 
Another respondent felt that although superintendents had been largely 
excluded from policy development in the past, several developments make 
that situation unlikely to continue for much longer. 
"The Memorandum of Agreement clearly indicates that the 
policy issues it covers will have to be monitored. The 
Organisation Development Unit has helped clarify the 'what' 
aspects of monitoring. On Thursday, 14 June 1990, the 29 
district superintendents met as a group to refine the 'what' 
aspects, but more importantly develop the 'how' process 
associated with monitoring. This was the first time that the 
superintendents had met as a group. This input into policy 
formation was appreciated. 
Another factor indicating that perhaps the district 
superintendent's role is in line for greater classification is 
the recent changes in the structure of the Central Office. 
The creation of a new division to be known as Schools 
Operations, headed by an executive director, will, I believe, 
give schools a more defined link with Central Office. I 
envisage that superintendents will play a significant role in 
linking schools and Central Office in this new structure. 
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Input into policy formation may be part of this link. One of 
the reasons given by the CEO for the structural changes is 'to 
enable Central Office to be more responsive to schools as they 
move towards self determination'. 
The industrial events of 1989 also indicated to Central 
Office that schools had to be listened to. The district 
superintendents are the closest senior officers to schools. 
Their knowledge about what is happening in schools will 
become, I believe, increasingly important to policy makers. 
Along with this, as the audit function of the district 
superintendents is developed and put into place, a logical end 
point in the process must be policy input. Audit processes 
naturally, I believe, lead to change. If policy 
implementation is consistently failing, as the Equal 
Opportunity Commission suggests is the case with equity 
issues, then change to either the policy or the implementation 
process is necessary. District superintendents must be in the 
the best position to signal what changes are needed." 
Several respondents challenged the majority view that superintendents 
should be centrally involved with state-wide policy formulation: 
"My job is not to set policy for the state. I don't have 
the overview, knowledge, or data." 
"How can you be a field-based person and actually write 
-Ministry policy. Some superintendents think they are going 
to drive policy. Their expectation of an involvement in 
policy formulation is quite strange because we don't have 
the time for that." 
Finally, one superintendent expressed concern that Chapter Three 
presented an unbalanced and negative account of the work of the directors 
of operations. He made the point that, 
11 
( ....... ) has been an outstanding director of operations as 
far as I am concerned. He has been extremely supportive and 
loyal to myself and to the principals and their schools in my 
district. He has gone out of his way to foster my own 
professional development as well as to enhance my role as a 
superintendent. The principals in my district recognise 
( ....... ) for his positive role and they are appreciative of 
his efforts. 11 
It should be acknowledged that during the initial round of interviews with 
thirteen superintendents similar tributes were paid to the directors of 
operations. Most of these were not included in the draft report because 
they fell outside the study's framework of analysis. Chapter Three dealt 
·.1 
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with perceptions of the director of operations' role in relation to policy 
development. Had it focussed on the provision of professional support for 
superintendents, more comments of the type quoted above could \1,e been 
documented. 
Chapter Four: The School Tier - Differences That Cause Difficulties 
Chapter Four focussed on the district superintendent's role in 
supporting and monitoring the performance of schools and principals. It 
outlined five issues which affect the definition of that role, namely: 
internal versus external review, school consultant versus system auditor, 
professional development versus performance appraisal, principal 
performance versus school performance, and secondary versus primary 
schools. 
The superintendents made little comment on this chapter. To some 
extent this is understandable given the clarification provided by the 
recent Memorandum of Agreement and the draft guidelines on demonstrating 
accountability being produced by the Organisation Development Unit. Even 
so, some mild dissent was registered. For example, one superintendent 
said: 
"Generally this was a chapter with which I have little 
argument. I don't think there is as much conflict between 
roles and duties as you often suggest. The majority of 
district superintendents have excellent executive level 
skills and they can be very good at wearing numerous hats." 
None of the respondents indicated a preference for setting up external 
review units along South Australian and New South Wales lines; all seemed 
satisfied with the West Australian approach. Some superintendents, 
though, intimated that by the end of the decade Western Australia should 
be able to shed external monitoring and adopt the system of internal 
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reviews exemplified in the Victorian model. Also, the dichotomy between 
support and appraisal raised some mixed comment: 
"Organisations which separate policeman and supporter roles 
don't work." 
"Helper and judge - these two roles are diametrically 
opposed." 
"The conflict situation associated with the 'consultant' 
versus audit issue is real. The solution is to split the 
functions so that each is dealt with by different personnel. 
This also applies to the professional development versus 
appraisal issue." 
Of the five issues discussed in Chapter Four, the one which attracted most 
comment was the difference between supervising primary and secondary 
schools. According to some superintendents, no significant difference 
exists. 
Finally, one superintendent raised the possibility that we might be 
trying "to resolve conflict without seeking the value that it may offer in 
terms of alternative solutions." Instead of an issue-by-issue critique, 
he made a general response to Chapter Four in these terms: 
"You seem to have picked out the essential contradictions 
very well. The criticial point to me, however, is not that 
these contradictions should be sorted out but rather, how can 
those contradictions be used to help us all work out what is 
needed? The former process usually degenerates into an 
'either-or' scenario, while the latter process has the virtue, 
if managed properly, to throw up a whole lot of alternatives. 
Contradictions are essential features of the process of 
self-determination, as they facilitate and create alternative 
solutions for differing circumstances and problems. Such a 
position, I realize, ls open to challenge in terms of such 
things as equity and equality, and of how we come to some form 
of uniformity and ·a set of standards. I think a couple of 
questions can be posed as starting points to discuss such a 
challenge, such as firstly, if what we now have in terms of 
equity and equality is a legacy of the previous system, then 
why not try something different. Secondly, are we about 
self-determination or are we about standardization; and when, 
where and for whom? 
The last question is a fundamental one. So, of course, is 
whether we can be centralized and decentralized at the same 
time, whether we can be idealistic and pragmatic 
concomitantly, or resolve individual needs as we balance those 
against system needs, or set in place flexibility, innovation 
~md responsiveness as we seek effectiveness, efficiency and 
accountability. All I can say is that answers to such 
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contradictions are not found by setting in place 'the rules' 
or 'the system' or 'the structure'. They are found by 
grappling with each situation or contradiction relative to 
person, time, place and circumstance." 
Chapter Five: Confiict Between the Tiers 
Chapter Five began with the statement that ideally a system of 
self-determining schools is characterised by unity within diversity. It 
went on to examine how the prospect of achieving that ideal was threatened 
by conflict between Central office and schools, and how the role of the 
superintendent, in turn, was affected by that conflict. The analysis 
attracted very little dissent. 
One superintendent, though, asked, "What's the difference if I argue 
that it is 'diversity within unity' - a set of boundaries within which to 
operate?" Diagrammatically, the difference between the two perspectives 
can be represented as follows. 
Unity in Diversity Diversity ln Unity 
/ 
l 
A third possibility is 'unity within bounded diversity'. A fourth is 
'unity within broken bounded diversity' in which the boundary forms a 
break to slow down rather than prohibit 'way out' non-conformity. 
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One, in fact the only, sustained response to Chapter Five suggested 
that conflict between the two tiers is better regarded as a phenomenon 
than a problem: 
· "Are you intimating that ideology played a hugely significant 
role in what happened? I can see that historically, it is 
possible to make a powerful and logical argument that the 
need for two tiers was, on the one hand, to make the system 
more flexible and creative, and on the other, to make it more 
efficient and accountable. To do that, there needed to be 
change. Change, of itself, brings confiict and in this 
sense, I see the industrial division as no more than an 
outcome of the process of change, and the ideological base as 
the reason for the change. My framework is grossly 
oversimplified and hierarchical; that the ideology of 
certain people (including politicians) created the need, need 
caused the change in structure (both system and curriculum), 
and the industrial division was the means by which people 
were able to make their feelings known about what had 
happened. Sure, the work of a superintendent would be easier 
if the divisions did not exist, but if they didn't we would 
be inert and incapable of working towards self-determning 
schools. Thus, let's see conflict as a positive process." 
Chapter Six: The Superintendent's Power in Relation to Principals 
Chapter Six examined the nature and extent of the superintendent's 
power in relation to principals - particularly with respect to the 
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management of change and the exercise of appropriate quality control in 
schools. Two types of power were identified: force (formal authority 
backed by sanctions) and legitimacy. 
Most reviewers agreed with the analysis in Chapter Six but s~me said it 
did not go far enough. For example, one superintendent said he was still 
left with the conceptual problem of finding the balance between promoting 
self-determination, giving away power, and retaining accountability. The 
question he posed for himself was: "How can anyone look to give people 
responsibility and still state that ultimately the giver of responsibility 
remains accountable?" In more detail, he said: 
"I seek legitimacy for my actions. I'm an idealist - I 
only want power so long as I can give it away. But if I'm 
going to give it away, then I must also give away 
accountability, otherwise I will spend my life dominating 
others so I can be accountable for whatever happens. There 
are many who argue, and actually state to my face, that I 
can't give power away because I can't give accountability 
away. I admit to having trouble in doing it, not only 
practically but conceptually, but it is something I need to 
be able to do. It is what I am searching for, and is why I 
said to you, and I've said to others, that in the best of 
all possible worlds, if I do the role properly there should 
be no role left for me. Unless I go on searching for that, 
I can never see devolution working or any form of 
self-determination taking place, because people will never 
be able to be accountable, and thus responsible, for their 
own actions. I will be the one accountable, and thus 
responsible." 
Another superintendent suggested that separating power into force and 
legitimacy allowed other important distinctions to slip through the 
sieve. One of these was the difference between the contextual and 
component variables associated with supervision. In his experience, 
principals considered the contextual variables more important than the 
component ones; they say to him, "Who does your job is more important 
than the job." Thus the amount of power a superintendent has depends 
largely on "principals' perceptions of the authenticity and integrity of 
the supervisor." 
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In relation to the power and influence of district superintendents, a 
reference group member said: 
"I feel this issue of line management in education is 
causing a lot of angst amongst district superintendents and 
principals. There is confusion about just what 'being the 
principal's boss' means. I reckon the key is to focus on · 
the difference between doing what you're told - and - being 
accountable to someone for your performance. District 
superintendents have swung on the pendulum of 'we can tell 
them what to do' to 'we can only suggest/influence/guide.' 
They haven't really explored the position, 'the principal 
must demonstrate to me that the school is performing 
satisfactorily.' Maybe this is not the place to tease it 
out, I feel it is a theme which is going to be played out a 
lot over the next couple of years." 
He also offerred the observation that: 
"Much of the focus for the district superintendent's role 
has been on how it is a less powerful, more restriGted 
leadership role. District superintendents have privately 
wondered whether it is substantial enough to justify a 
Level 8 status. I think more could be said about the 
complexity and subtlety of the 'audit' role, the 
challenging business of appraising a school, the higher 
level management skills involved, etc. The demands that 
these high level skills place upon superintendents are not 
appreciated by most people." 
Several superintendents emphasized that the need for power only becomes 
an issue with principals who are opposed to the new structure. With other 
principals there ls no problem. For example: 
"Some 'merit promotion' principals are racing ahead of 
teachers in implementing the Better Schools Report and I 
have to put the reins on them. Other 'seniority 
principals' are still trying to shut the gate on changes 
rung out by the Better Schools Report four years after its 
release." 
Chapter Seven: Concluding Remarks 
Chapter Seven concluded that the essential role of district 
superintendents in a centrally supervised system of self-determining 
schools is control, and in performing that role they are agents of equity 
as well as excellence. A few superintendents challenged aspects of that 
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conclusion. One said that the term 'control' sounded too much like "speed 
cop". Another objected to the term and concept of 'control' on the 
grounds that "it is a bit foreign" and it does not sit easy with 
"androgynous management". Furthermore, said this superintende~t. 
" 'Control' is the wrong frame for me. It's the frame of 
the old inspectorial mode. It's too regulatory. It locks 
us out of training and development and fails to convey the 
sophistication and complexities of the nature of our work." 
And for a third superintendent, 
" 'Control' is the synonym for audit and hence the current 
buzz word. Have we internalized it to such a prominent 
extent as you express so succinctly?" 
Two respondents suggested that the report could have done more to 
develop and endorse the notion that superintendents are agents of equity. 
Both commended the Equal Opportunity Commission Reports S.82 (b) as 
documents with significant implications for the work of superintendents, 
particularly with respect to monitoring the contestation of resources and 
the implementation of central policies at the local level. 
A Concern About the Report 
Overall, most superintendents welcomed the report as a useful and 
timely document for taking stock of the past and clarifying ideas for the 
future. Several, however, expressed concern that it was too negative. 
One super!ntendent wondered where responsibility for the pessimism lay 
with the interviewer or the interviewees. He suggested that had a more 
directive interviewing style been adopted, a more optimistic picture would 
have emerged. For example, superintendents could have been asked, "What 
do you see for the future." Or, "Do you see the future of tne 
superintendency with pessimism or optimism and why?" That would have 
prevented them becoming pre-occupied with their dissatisfaction about the 
102 
past. Speaking for himself, he said that he was "pessimistic looking 
backward - retrospectively, but optimistic looking forward -
prospectively." On the other side of the ledger, said this 
superintendent, because the non-directive interviewing style left the 
agenda largely with the interviewees, they had an open opportunity to say 
how they felt and in the event "conveyed pessimism and suspicion." 
Another concerned superintendent accounted for the pessimism in terms 
of two factors. Firstly, he said that, apart from a meeting in January 
1988 when a document was handed out about the superintendency, 
"There has never been an inservicing on how a district office 
should be run. So, each superintendent made his or her 
interpretation depending on whether they were young or old and 
city or country. Had we been brought together for two days 
and taught how to run an effective district office then we 
wouldn't see the negativism displayed in the report." 
Secondly, he thought the views coming through the report were 
predominantly those of 'old' (pre-1987) city superintendents who had to 
deal with secondary schools. So far as he could see, it was those 
superintendents who faced most difficulty maintaining optimism, partly 
because "secondary schools feel they can't get much out of district 
offices and there are more of them in the city than in the country." 
That theme was taken up by a superintendent who constructed a 
three-dimensional matrix to depict his perceptions. According to him, the 
superintendents most likely to be less than optimistic were those 
represented in the shaded section of the matrix below. 
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In line with what proved to be a somewhat common theme, two other 
superintendents made these observations: 
"Many comments reflect a cynicism which could also show the 
difference between the 'old' (i.e. pre 1987) and the 'new' 
(first appointed in 1988) superintendents. The report does 
not seem to take into account these different perspectives· -
i.e. one group who are critical and who feel frustrated and 
disempowered by the changes and another group who have taken 
up the challenge of the new order. Does the variation between 
districts reflect these attitudes?" 
"Of the thirteen superintendents you spoke to, the vast 
majority must have been 'old' superintendents. The quotes in 
Chapter Three are all from one point of view. If you had 
spoken to a greater range of people you may have got another 
side to the argument as well. When I read those quotes I got 
an impression they came from people who had been 
superintendents before." 
Not surprisingly, some other superintendents took a different 
perspective on these matters. For example: 
"There is no simple dichotomy. Superintendents are spread 
along a continuum and some of the 'old' believe there are many 
major improvements to the system under Better Schools." 
"Some of the new superintendents are running districts like 
the regions. The old superintendents know what not to do; 
they are more in the new mould. The new superintendents are 
modelling themselves on the old regional superintendents, 
though some new superintendents have a good understanding of 
the new system" 
Of the thirteen superintende·nts initially interviewed, five were not 
superintendents before 1987 - they were 'new'. Judging from the 
collective comments made during the interviews, it would be fair to say 
that, as a group, the 'new' superintendents were no more or less 
optimistic than the 'old' superintendents, as a group. 
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Late Response 
A number of respondents considered that this report, "does not speak 
about the role, the theory of the role, or the variety of approaches to 
the role of the district superintendent." Instead, it focusses on "t.he 
human dynamics in a very changing government organisation." It deals with 
"the uncertainties, confusions, and contradictions of our circumstances 
sin'Ce 1988." Though not necessarily a dissenting response, the following 
letter from a district superintendent bears out those impressions to some 
extent. It is reproduced without analysis or comment because it arrived 
late in the piece and there is a certain unity to it. 
Rod, I have been a little tardy in getting these notes into some 
kind of form, however for what they are worth, here they are. 
My judgement is that we are heading in the direction of the two 
tier system to which you allude. Initially, extreme difficulties 
were experienced by all major players as the concept of 
decentralising and recentralising simultaneously is quite novel to 
those in the teaching force of Western Australia. It was clearly 
not possible to explain to 25,000 just exactly what was encompassed 
in this complex concept. In truth, there wasn't very much 
explaining to anybody at all. Most of the awareness phase consisted 
of Ministerial statements, newspaper articles and some public 
addresses - a load which was carried by a very small group in 
Central Office. 
As Superintendents were not involved in framing the new 
visions/directions involved for the education system, some did not 
necessarily agree to this way of doing things. They didn't clearly 
understand the major concepts and it seemed some didn't accept the 
importance of the vision. My observations indicate that this 
interferred with communication between Central Office and the school 
face, because teachers quickly perceived a diffidence on the part of 
some Superintendents to give confident, wholehearted commitment to 
this new vision. 
It is my observation that a similar scenario has developed between 
principals and their school staff. It's probably reasonable to 
observe that in some stances, official Ministry polices do now exist 
on paper but they have yet to transfer into the hearts and minds of 
the teaching population. Conversely, it might be argued that many 
time worn and successful practices in schools continue to exist for 
that very reason. These make a significant impact on the role that 
Superintendents are obliged to take, but may well not be sanctioned 
by official policy. An example is that schools desire to be 
identified with the District Office because it has the 
Superintendent who will be a leader and a decision maker, thus 
removing this responsibility from teachers. There is also the 
problem of principals gathering together to discuss and define 
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district perceptions of Ministry policy and the tendency to look to 
the Superintendent for decisions in this area, where in fact, Better 
Schools policy is that Central Office policies take precedence -
districts do not create policy. If there is to be any variation of 
Central Office policy, it is to be at school level and designed to 
meet local needs that have been identified by analysis of data. 
The role of the Superintendent has been clearly established in the 
minds of teachers and principals over a period of some one hundred 
years. These people exert pressure to maintain aspects of that role 
they believe to be effective in the running of efficient schools: 
As you rightly point out, some of them also exert pressure to 
maintain aspects of that role that has advantages to them. 
One quote on page 36 indicated that -Superintendents look to 
Directors of Operations for goals a.nd leadership, as principals look 
to Superintendents, regardless of the fact that leadership may not 
be part of the future Superintendent's role; this applies to a 
limited number of Superintendents. My view would be that the 
Director of Operation's role is very diffuse, interpreted in at 
least five quite different minds and defined by 29 diverse 
Superintend en ts. 
I believe a large number of Superintendents have formed their own 
definition of the role. The fact that Superintendents are largely 
concerned with control puts them, as pointed out by your report, in 
the response mode and unless the Superintendent can operate very 
adroitly, principals respond with the defence mode. This aspect of 
the role is frequently perceived by the schools in a negative light 
and removes a considerable amount of the job satisfaction available 
to the Superintendent. 
Prior to 1987, there was more scope for Superintendents to act as 
an educational role model/leader. It is also pertinent to observe 
that much of the power Superintendents ostensibly have in the 
decision making area is often eroded when Central Officers revenie 
decisions without giving a rationale and where it appears they have 
not fully considered the various local factors that impinged upon 
the Superintendent's decision. There are times when a great deal of 
time and effort are expended by a Superintendent and there is no 
evidence that Central Officers appreciate this contribution. 
It is clear the role is an evolving one with many significant 
changes still to come. It's my view that this report is an 
interesting and useful beginning and much research still remains to 
be done. 
Best wishes 
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